Columbia’s Manhattanville Expansion: Community Planning Confronts Institutional Elitism

When Columbia University first announced its intention to create a new campus in the Manhattanville neighborhood of West Harlem (125th to 133rd streets between Broadway and Riverside) in 2003, the university initially promised that the expansion would involve a collaborative partnership with the Harlem community. This promise represented a significant departure from the university’s historically troubled relationship with Harlem; a history marked by acrimonious racial and class conflict as Columbia expanded control over its Morningside Heights neighborhood and intentionally sought to segregate the neighborhood from Harlem throughout the 20th century (Bergdoll 1997, Bradley 2003, Schwartz 1993, Slonecker 2008). By promising to work with the Harlem community, Columbia raised hopes that the university would try to overcome its history of elitist, exclusionary development and forge an improved relationship of mutually beneficial interaction and cooperation. Indeed, Columbia’s President Lee Bollinger proudly proclaimed in 2004 that “Columbia is a different neighbor now…We want to stay here and be a great world university and be part of building the community” (Lee Bollinger, as quoted in Bagli 2004).

However, when Columbia revealed its concept plan for Manhattanville—a plan calling for the complete takeover and demolition of 17 acres\(^1\) for the construction for a $6.38 billion state-of-the-art research campus—the Harlem community was outraged. Instead of an attempt at partnership, Columbia’s plan appeared to be effort to annex a large area of West Harlem to its private domain, wiping valuable community businesses and residences completely off the map and replacing them with research and classroom facilities of little use to a population of low-income people of color with limited educational attainment.

\(^1\) With the exception of three buildings of “historical significance” that will be preserved
Columbia’s rhetoric of community partnership was apparently nothing more than a disingenuous public relations tactic.

Searching for a way to respond to Columbia’s unilateral plan, the West Harlem community decided to accelerate the development of Community Board 9’s “197-a” plan in order to establish a more balanced alternative for the university’s expansion. The “197-a” planning process, named for the section of the City Charter in which it is described, was established in 1989 to empower each of New York’s 59 community boards to compose and submit plans for adoption by the City Planning Commission and City Council. 197-a planning is intended to provide a larger voice for local community concerns in land use decisions. However, unlike a “197-c” rezoning plan (described under Section 197-c of the City Charter), city government has chosen to interpret 197-a plans as “policy guides” that do not have the force of law.

After an intensive two year process of community meetings, Community Board 9 (CB9) completed the 197-a plan in 2005 (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 5). Rather than allow Columbia to seize, demolish, and redevelop the entire site as a campus, the 197-a plan encourages the city to support contextual and inclusionary zoning in which the university can expand within the current fabric of the community. Columbia University, however, refused to compromise and has continued to press forward with its unilateral plan. The university is backed by both the city and state governments of New York in its insistence that only full takeover and redevelopment of the 17 acre Manhattanville site will allow Columbia to remain a world-class research university in the 21st century (ESDC 2008). In December 2007, the City Council approved both CB9’s 197-a plan and Columbia University’s 197-c

New York City is divided into 59 community boards, composed of up to 50 members appointed by the board’s Borough President. Manhattan Community Board 9 encompasses the area from 110th street to 155th street on the west side of Manhattan, the neighborhoods of Morningside Heights, Manhattanville, and Hamilton Heights.

The Pratt Center for Community Development (PICCED) provided technical assistance.
rezoning, effectively invalidating the 197-a without officially rejecting it because only the 197-c rezoning has the force of law. In December 2008, the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), the state’s economic development body, approved the use of eminent domain in support of the project and has since been embroiled in a lawsuit with property owners over the legality of this action.

The controversial process of Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion provides an ideal case study for examining two major issues affecting equity in contemporary urban development: the elitist and exclusionary politics that many urban universities continue to practice in regard to low-income communities of color, and the unjust dominance of private developers over local communities in planning the future of global cities.

The first section of the paper will provide an overview of Columbia's historical relationship with Harlem. Beginning in the 1940’s, Columbia aggressively acted to prevent the spread of Harlem’s growing black population into Morningside Heights by purchasing real estate and evicting thousands of low-income minority tenants in the name of expanding university facilities (Bergdoll 1997, Slonecker 2008). The university also collaborated with Robert Moses to establish a clear “socio-spatial barrier” separating Morningside from Harlem in the form of super-block housing tower developments at 123rd St (Schwartz 1993). Columbia’s success in “preserving” Morningside Heights is startlingly clear: In 2000, Harlem north of 123rd Street and east of Morningside Park was over 95% black and Hispanic and predominantly low-income, while Morningside Heights was over 70% white and decidedly middle and upper income (U.S. Census Bureau, as cited in CB9 & PICCED, 2007: 119). This exclusionary geography of race and class is crucial to understanding Columbia’s aversion to working with the Harlem community on Manhattanville and the community’s fears regarding the potential impact of the expansion.

After establishing the historical background, I will then compare and contrast
Columbia’s vision for Manhattanville with CB9’s community-based plan. As described above, Columbia intends to claim the entire 17 acre area for construction of a 6.8 million square foot academic research campus, seizing any remaining holdout businesses through eminent domain. Acting through a liberal-economics paradigm of trade-offs, the university intends to provide displaced residents with replacement housing and compensate the community at large with a $76 million dollar Community Benefits Agreement and a $20 million dollar affordable housing fund (ESDC, 2008). Alternatively, CB9’s plan suggests that Columbia should work with the community to craft a contextual expansion that shares the benefits of development more directly with the existing population and avoids displacing any businesses or residents who wish to remain. The community plan particularly emphasizes preservation of the invaluable, well-paying industrial and artisan jobs that were growing in the neighborhood before Columbia began to acquire the real estate (CB9 & PICCED 2007).

My third section will offer an analysis of community participation in the planning process, exposing the stark contrast between the potentially empowering, participatory nature of 197-a planning and the backroom manipulation and chicanery of Columbia’s effort to acquire Manhattanville. Instead of acting as a responsible civic institution and seeking democratic involvement in the process, Columbia has acted like a private real estate developer in exercising its potent economic power to unilaterally purchase Manhattanville property, often using the eminent domain threat as leverage (Gonzalez 2004). Columbia has also spent millions to hire lobbyists and political insiders such as former Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch and former Mayor David Dinkins to win city and state support for their plan (Williams 2007, 2008, Schrod 2007, Schuerman 2007). Throughout the process, Columbia officials only attended the public forums required by New York’s ULURP (Uniform Land Use Review Procedure) and never moved beyond the level of top-down presentation of information about the purported benefits their plan. But the most outrageous indictment of Columbia’s
behavior—and by extension, of New York’s current planning system—is the evidence that Columbia colluded with ESDC and the city’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC) to purposely blight Manhattanville and manipulate environmental studies to justify the use of eminent domain (Tuck-it-Away et al vs. New York State Urban Development Corporation, 2009).

In the Manhattanville expansion, Columbia’s decades-long pattern of disrespect and disregard for the Harlem community has combined with the New York elite’s decades-long pattern of pursuing top-down development of the high-end, globally oriented service economy 4 to produce a particularly inequitable plan and process. Columbia and ESDC’s justification for the expansion plan rests on the argument that Columbia must grow in order to remain a globally competitive research university, and that this growth will benefit New York City. These promises that mega-development growth will “trickle down” to all New Yorkers, as Columbia promises with the Manhattanville expansion, have been made countless times in recent decades. The real consequences of top-down globally oriented mega-developments are revealed in the continued growth of social stratification in New York as the poor and middle class lose ground and the rich get richer 5.

Unlike Columbia’s top-down mega-project, the community’s plan recognizes the need for a balance of global and local priorities and the value of participatory processes that can provide forums for rational deliberation of the costs and benefits of different development strategies. It is my hope that this analysis of the Columbia expansion will clearly demonstrate the bankruptcy of the current development process in New York and the potential of community planning as an alternative that provides democratic agency and crafts strong policy for a more equitable and sustainable 21st century city.

5 From 1989 to 2000, average income dropped 15% for the poorest 40% of New York City residents and 8.5% for the middle 40%, while the wealthiest 20% saw their incomes grow by 18% (Moody 2007: 106).
Columbia and Harlem – A Legacy of Racial and Class Conflict and Inequity

This history of Columbia University in Northern Manhattan begins in 1896, when the university relocated from midtown to the rural expanse of Morningside Heights to establish a master-planned campus with greater room for its burgeoning student body. The original plan for the campus, designed by noted “City Beautiful” architect Charles McKim in the Beaux Arts style, imagined the university “carving a zone apart from the city, controlling its own horizons” (Bergdoll 1997, 67). This bucolic vision was quickly challenged by the rapid urbanization of Upper Manhattan that began with the completion of the IRT subway line in 1904. Determined to preserve the character of the campus, Columbia began in 1907 to construct a perimeter of buildings enclosing the central library and courtyard area. According to Bergdoll, this enclosure of the campus from the surrounding, burgeoning neighborhood crystallized an attitude that would characterize the university’s development for the next century—“Columbia became decidedly in, rather than of, the city of New York” (Bergdoll 1997: 74).

Columbia’s effort to maintain its campus character acquired a new dimension when Harlem began to become heavily African American. At the time of Columbia’s relocation to Morningside, Harlem was a prestigious, wealthy white area, but African Americans began to arrive in large numbers around 1915 as the great influx of southern blacks to the cities of the North accelerated and the native blacks of New York City were increasingly displaced from downtown neighborhoods like the Tenderloin district by new developments such as Penn Station and Macy’s department store (Maurrasse 2006: 17). The migration from the South and displacement from downtown coincided with a real estate bust in Northern Manhattan that originated with the rapid overdevelopment that followed the construction of the subway lines, prompting a “panic sale” in Harlem in which more than two-thirds of the homes were sold to new owners who were willing to rent to African Americans (Maurrasse 2006: 18).
By 1920, Central Harlem was 32% black. By 1930, the black community had grown to more than 70% of the Harlem population and was rapidly spreading south and west towards Morningside Heights, prompting acute consternation in Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler and the university’s elite benefactors including the Rockefeller family.

On the eve of his retirement in 1945, President Butler wrote a letter to Columbia’s trustees advocating that the university should urgently act to “unify Morningside…and protect ourselves against invasion from the North…[for] at any time we might find an apartment house on Morningside Heights has been purchased to be occupied by Harlem tenants.” Butler’s solution to this impending disaster lay in “owning the title to all of this [Morningside] property” in order to “achieve the unity of Morningside Heights which I have had in mind for a half century” (Nicholas Murray Butler as quoted in Bergdoll 1997, 99). To remain an elite Ivy League university, Columbia required an elite Ivy League environment, of which working class minorities could be no part. The university pursued Butler’s vision with zeal, acquiring 108 new buildings in Morningside between 1940 and 1966 and forcibly evicting more than 7,000 residents, 85% of whom were African American or Puerto Rican (Slonecker 2008: 970). Columbia thus maintained its ideal campus environment on Morningside by conducting a virtual ethnic cleansing of the neighborhood.

Alongside the mass purchase of real estate in Morningside Heights and eviction of non-university affiliated tenants, a plan to complete the “fortressing” of Morningside from

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While the use “ethnic cleansing” may seem like an exaggeration, the American Heritage Dictionary defines the term as “the systematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide” (italics mine)
Harlem (already partially accomplished due to the natural topographical barrier of the
Morningside Park ridge) was also initiated at this time. “Morningside Heights Inc,” was
formed in 1947 by Columbia and neighboring institutions including Juilliard School of Music
(before it moved to Lincoln Center), Riverside Church, and Union Theological Seminary to
pursue the redevelopment of the northern edge of the Heights bounded by 123rd, 125th,
Broadway, and Morningside Avenue (Schwartz 1993: 157). The organization received heavy
backing from the Rockefeller family, longtime patrons of the Morningside institutions, who
were compelled by the impassioned pleas of Butler and the head of Riverside Church, the
Rev. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, to act to protect “the community into which Mr. John D.
Rockefeller for example, has put so large an investment and into which some of us have put
the best portions of our lives” (Harry Fosdick as quoted in Schwartz 1993: 153).

By 1953, Morningside Heights Inc. emerged successful in lobbying for the
construction of super-block housing projects at the neighborhood’s northern border with
Harlem. “Morningside Gardens,” a middle income development a la Stuyvesant Town,
would be constructed to the immediate north of Columbia’s campus at 123rd street, with the General Grant public housing complex flanking it on the North and East and the Manhattanville public housing complex further to the north on Broadway past 125th street (Schwartz 1993: 196). As Larry Orton, head of the
NYC Planning Commission noted, these super-block projects provided “a physical
stabilization of conditions to the north.” In other words, they effectively acted as barriers to
the further intrusion of low-income minorities into Morningside Heights (Schwartz 1993:
159).
After successfully collaborating with the power brokers of post-war urban renewal to accomplish this “fortressing” of the neighborhood, Columbia still required further space to expand in order to keep pace with the growth of its Ivy League rivals. In 1966, the university proposed a $200 million dollar plan for a significant expansion of facilities in Morningside Heights, including new modernist super-blocks to the immediate south and east of McKim’s original campus (Bergdoll 1997: 114). Included in this plan was the construction of a new gym facility in the southern half of Morningside Park, part of a deal to lease a portion of the park that had been arranged with Robert Moses in 1960 (Bergdoll 1997: 109). Criticism of the gym and the 1966’s plan’s intended demolition of entire city blocks quickly emerged after its publication, with Ada Louis Huxtable, the New York Times architectural critic, lamenting “the proven inability of the university to see the environment as a whole and recognize the highest level of professional vision” (as quoted in Bergdoll 1997: 115).

Indeed, Columbia’s failure to recognize the social and political implications of its planned expansion into Morningside Park led the university’s relationship with the Harlem community to deteriorate ever further, until the combustible situation finally ignited with the infamous 1968 student protest occupation of the campus. While the events of 1968 are better remembered in the popular imagination for the Student Democratic Society’s occupation of the library and offices of President Grayson Kirk in protest of the university’s relationship with the U.S. Department of Defense, it was the Student African Society’s (SAS) occupation of Hamilton Hall in conjunction with Harlem activists to demand the end of gym construction that played a far greater role in impacting university policy.

Labeling the project “Gym Crow” for its taking of public space used by the black community for the use of the overwhelmingly white Columbia students, the SAS brought Harlem community leaders and national civil rights figures such as Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown to join the students in condemning the gym. Ray Brown, the leader of SAS,
pointed out that the gym was only the most recent and blatant example of “Columbia’s use of its position of political strength to take advantage of the powerlessness of the black community” (as quoted in Bradley 2003: 166). Fearing a race riot like the one that had recently taken place in Harlem after the assassination of Martin Luther King, the Columbia administration agreed to permanently cancel the gym project, and the Hamilton Hall protestors left the building peacefully (Slonecker 2008: 984). The partially completed excavation for the gym’s foundation was left to blight Morningside Park for two decades, leaving Harlem with a physical scar of Columbia’s discriminatory expansion attempt until it was refurbished into an ornamental pond in 1988.

After the experience of the 1968 protests, Columbia abandoned its grandiose efforts at new campus construction and instead continued to expand in piecemeal fashion within Morningside Heights. As a manifestation of the larger Civil Rights movement, the SAS-Harlem protest at Hamilton Hall served as a potent check on the university’s ambition to expand its zone of control in Northern Manhattan, employing the threat of violence and social upheaval to counter the university’s economic and political power for the first time (Bradley 2003: 166).

Throughout its first 70 years on the Heights, Columbia University fervently attempted to control the neighborhood through unilateral top-down planning, driven by competition with its Ivy League peers to maintain a physical and social environment worthy of its elite status. For the Columbia administrators and trustees, this required both the preservation of Morningside Heights as an upper-class white community and a constant expansion of facilities, objectives that were inimical with the growing presence of the predominantly low-
income African American community of Harlem to the north and east. Through consolidation of real estate holdings on the Heights, the eviction of non-university tenants (85% minority as cited above), and construction of the super-block barrier to the north, Columbia was enormously successful in preserving Morningside Heights as an socially homogenous upper-class white area. Throughout the 1970’s, 80’s, and 90’s, the university continued to add to its Morningside holdings and now owns over 6,000 apartment units (87% of which are occupied by university-affiliated residents), making it the largest landowner in New York City outside the Catholic Church (Lee 2003). In 2000, Morningside Heights was over 70% white while areas just a few blocks to the north and east in Harlem, on the other side of the “socio-spatial barrier,” were over 95% black and Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau, as cited in CB9 & PICCED, 2007: 119).
Columbia’s zealous efforts to “preserve” its neighborhood have had the toxic side-effect of engendering an antagonistic relationship with the Harlem community, one that exploded in the protests of 1968 when Columbia attempted to expand beyond Morningside Heights proper. An atmosphere of racial and class-based antipathy and mutual suspicion has pervaded Columbia’s relations with Harlem ever since, and this history is crucial in order to fully understand the current controversy over the Manhattanville expansion. When current President Lee Bollinger asserts his desire for a campus expansion with a definite “Columbia identity,” this history of racial exclusion and aggressive unilateralism invokes legitimate distrust and fear in the residents of West Harlem for the future of their communities (Bollinger as quoted in Gonzalez, 2004).

The Importance of Context:
Comparing the Columbia Plan and CB9 Alternative for the Manhattanville Expansion

Columbia’s proposed Manhattanville project is the university’s first attempt to expand outside of Morningside Heights since the 1968 gym debacle, and the first effort to establish an entirely new campus area since moving to Northern Manhattan in 1896. Considering the stark socioeconomic segregation between Morningside Heights and West Harlem that has prevailed during the last century, the expansion will undoubtedly initiate profound and lasting changes in the social and economic geography of Northern Manhattan that will likely impact the future development of New York City as a whole. In this section I will provide a comparative overview of each of the competing plans for the expansion before moving on to a more detailed analysis of the contrasting levels of community participation and potential socio-economic impact.

As described earlier in this paper, Columbia’s 197-c plan for Manhattanville—completed in 2005 and designed by the university in consultation with renowned architects Renzo Piano and Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill—calls for complete takeover of the 17 acre
site with almost all of the existing structures to be demolished for construction of an 6.8 million square foot academic research campus including a 2 million square foot basement spanning the breadth of the site (ESDC 2008: 2). The construction costs of the monumental project would total $6.28 billion and would proceed from north to south over a 25 year
period (ESDC 2008: 33). Columbia claims that facilities on this scale are necessary to ensure its continued status as a premier world research university, emphasizing that the “large, open, rectangular floor plates” possible in such a massive structure “are required to maximize flexibility and interaction among scientists of various disciplines” (ESDC 2008: 7). The university also cites the current expansion plans of its Ivy League competitors at Harvard, Yale, and UPenn as justification for the project’s scope (ESDC 2008: 9).

In lobbying for approval of the plan, Columbia has emphasized the “open,” “integrated” nature of the proposed new campus, noting that the streets will remain accessible to traffic and the structures built with transparent street walls to encourage a welcoming atmosphere (ESDC 2008: 15). The one acre public plaza near the center of the development will be “gateless and publicly accessible,” though privately owned and maintained (ESDC 2008: 17). From an aesthetic point of view, this would indeed represent a departure from the character of the enclosed, gated campus in Morningside Heights. However, from a social point of view, it is questionable that the low-income minority population currently surrounding the expansion site would feel comfortable and welcome among Columbia’s privileged student body, of whom only 11.4% are African American or Hispanic (Columbia University Office of Planning and Institutional Research, 2008).

Columbia currently owns roughly 90% of the property in the proposed expansion’s footprint, and is seeking rights of eminent domain to remove the final resistant landowners (ESDC 2008: 27). When Columbia first began buying real estate in Manhattanville in 2002, many local businesses initially resisted selling, forming the “West Harlem Business Group” in an effort to organize against the university’s efforts. In 2004, this group claimed fourteen members, by June 2008, only two remained, Overall, more than three dozen businesses have sold their property to Columbia since 2002, either leaving the area or agreeing to leave when construction commences (Williams, 2008). ESDC officially endorsed the use of the state’s
power of eminent domain on behalf of Columbia’s expansion on December 17, 2008 after a
study by the environmental consultants EarthTech Inc. determined the proposed site was
“blighted,” or “a substandard or unsanitary area…[that] tends to impair or arrest the sound
growth and development of the municipality” (ESDC 2008: 52). In justifying the agency’s
decision to employ its eminent domain powers to transfer the private property of the
Manhattanville landowners to the private Columbia University, ESDC spokesperson Warner
Johnson characterized the expansion as “a project of importance to the city and state of
which Columbia is the sponsor” (as quoted in Kilgannon and Stowe, 2008). The ESDC
published the final plan for the site, which I have been citing throughout this paper, on the
very next day, December 18th.

According to this final draft of the plan, the 298 residents who currently live in the
expansion footprint will be provided with Columbia-constructed replacement housing (ESDC
2008: 30). In order to compensate the West Harlem community for the impact of the project,
Columbia has proposed numerous initiatives, including community access to the new
swimming pool, forty undergraduate scholarships reserved for Harlem residents, the
establishment of job training programs, $76 million dollars for a Community Benefits
agreement, and $20 million dollars for the establishment of an affordable housing fund
(ESDC 2008: 41-48). The agreement for the CBA was negotiated behind closed doors with a
newly established local development corporation. While Columbia has publicly trumpeted
the generosity of the CBA, the $96 million dollars in community funding represents only
1.5% of the $6.28 billion dollar cost of the expansion project. In contrast, CB9 cites the
example of the 2001 Staples Center project in Los Angeles, where $75 million was allocated
for the CBA in a development that cost roughly $1 billion dollars, equaling 7.5% of the total
project cost (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 20). Despite the relative paucity of Columbia’s CBA,
its mere existence gives Columbia and the city a political win by providing a veneer of
responsiveness to community concerns. CBA’s are a growing trend in New York
development as they enable “a liberal-economics paradigm of trade-offs” with communities
to achieve a false sense of consensus and silence more substantive objections (Fainstein
2001: 158)

The content and layout of Columbia’s plan is finalized and the financing is in place. The only barrier remaining is a lawsuit brought by Nicholas Sprayregen, the owner of five buildings that compose the “Tuck-it-Away” self-storage business, and the Singh family, whom own two gas stations, challenging the constitutionality of ESDC’s exercise of eminent domain on Columbia’s behalf (Finn, 2008). In December 2009, the plaintiffs won an extraordinary 3-2 decision against ESDC—and by extension, Columbia’s plan—in the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court (Tuck-it-Away et al vs. New York State Urban Development Corporation, 2009). The court’s decision struck down ESDC’s use of eminent domain on the grounds that Columbia’s plan is not a “civic project” in the public interest, and the fact that an improper, biased study that was used to determine “blight” in Manhattanville, an issue I will address in detail in the following section.

While the fate of Columbia’s proposal rests on a final appeal to New York State’s Court of Appeals, a clear alternative proposal for the expansion in Manhattanville still exists in the 197-a plan produced by CB9, a plan that like Columbia’s 197-c, was approved by the City Council in December 2007. While the 197-a ostensibly outlines a plan for the entirety of Community District 9—from Morningside Heights in the south to Hamilton Heights in the north—its focus is clearly on Manhattanville and to a lesser extent Hamilton Heights. The lack of community planning for Morningside is unsurprising considering Columbia’s total

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7 New York State Urban Development Corporation is the official legal name of the Empire State Development Corporation

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dominance there. In composing the plan, CB9 facilitated monthly public meetings for twenty months from 2003-2004 to gather community input, and held three community-wide forums in the summer of 2004 to solicit feedback on draft versions (CB9 & PICCED 2007: 5). I will discuss the highly participatory nature of this process in detail in my next section.

The overall vision of the CB9 plan rejects Columbia’s unilateral takeover of the Manhattanville site and instead calls for the university to expand within the fabric of the existing neighborhood, avoiding the university’s planned near-total demolition of the area and displacement of residents and businesses who wish to stay. Alongside Columbia’s retrofitting of their current holdings or selective demolition and construction of new buildings for academic use, a diversity of development could be encouraged in Manhattanville through the creation of a customized zoning district that balances “production/light manufacturing, retail, and community facilities” (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 16). This kind of “contextual” campus expansion would accomplish much towards breaking down the socio-spatial and economic barriers that have divided Columbia’s Morningside Heights from the Harlem community. CB9 also specifically seeks to proscribe the use of
eminent domain in the area, voting unanimously against this option in 2004 and again this year in 2009 (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 53).

Overall, the most profound difference between Columbia’s plan and CB9’s is that the 197-a plan examines the development of a potential Columbia expansion in Manhattanville with regard for context—the site’s location in a traditionally industrial area surrounded by thousands of low-income minority residents. Indeed, the 197-a’s primary goal is to allow for growth “in a manner that promotes a diversity of incomes without displacement of existing residents” (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 8). The plan places a major emphasis on ensuring the preservation of industrial jobs, which currently provide 15% of local employment in the area and on average, pay wages that are far higher than in the service industry (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 9, 72). Indeed, manufacturing jobs pay an average of $52,000 a year—more than double the typical retail or hospitality job (Friedman 2009: 3).

CB9 points out that only 3% of the community district is currently zoned for industry with the vast majority lying in Manhattanville, where jobs had been growing and new businesses moving in until 2003 when Columbia began to discourage outside investment in the area with its demolition plans and vacate existing tenants (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 30-31, 72). Since the rest of the Community District 9 is largely built-out with residences and institutions, there is really no possibility of replacing the industrial jobs that will be lost if Columbia’s 197-c plan is carried out. In providing further support for its contention, CB9 cites a 2005 NYC policy paper produced by Mayor Bloomberg’s office which stresses the importance of industrial employment to residents with low-educational attainment and limited English proficiency, characteristics that are highly prevalent in the communities currently surrounding the Manhattanville site (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 29).

The theme of a contextual, integrative expansion continues in CB9’s argument for inclusionary zoning that will encourage the construction and preservation of affordable
housing in and around the Manhattanville site. CB9 points out that 90% of households in the district are renters, with more than 41% already “rent-burdened” paying more than 30% of gross income towards housing costs (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 12). Moreover, more than 40% of area households make less than $20,000 per annum, suggesting that the most these households could reasonably afford in rent is about $600 dollars per month (CB9 and PICCED 2007: 37). Already squeezed by gentrification pressures and the decline of area industrial jobs (due in great part to Columbia’s warehousing of the Manhattanville district) the risk of massive displacement is a real concern if Columbia’s 197-c is allowed to proceed.

Indeed, the mere proposal of the project is already impacting the community as evidenced by 3333 Broadway, a massive housing complex with over 1,000 apartments, opting out of the Mitchell-Lama affordable housing program in 2005\(^9\). In 2003, the average rent at 3333 Broadway was $703 per unit, while in 2008 new apartments were going for $2,351 per unit (Anderson et al 2008: 42). More than 65% of Manhattan’s original 41,095 units in the Mitchell-Lama program had been lost in this manner (Anderson et al 2008: 6). Considering that 3333 Broadway sold for $85 million in 2005 and again in 2007 at the astronomical price of $277 million (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2008), the $20 million affordable housing fund proposed by Columbia is woefully inadequate to mitigate the impact of the expansion.

The significance of this difference—that the 197-a recognizes the socio-economic context of a proposed Manhattanville campus expansion while Columbia’s 197-c seems to regard the site as a piece of real estate to be re-engineered for the university’s benefit with little regard for the surroundings—cannot be overstated. Having established this critical contrast between these two competing visions for Manhattanville, I will now move on to a

\(^9\)The “Mitchell Lama” program was created by New York State in 1955 to assist in the private development of affordable apartment complexes, but a provision exists for owners to leave the program after twenty years of occupation (Anderson et al 2008: 6)
more detailed analysis of community participation in the planning process.

The Manhattanville Planning Process: Condescension and Manipulation Defeat Progressive Efforts at Participation

Before evaluating community participation in the Manhattanville planning process, I believe it is first necessary to briefly address the current status of participatory engagement in the field of urban planning overall. The movement for increased participatory community involvement in the planning process began to gain strength in the 1980’s and was highly influenced by Marxist critical theory, the writings of Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas’ theories on communicative rationality and action (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones 2002: 6). Though extremely divergent, each of these theoretical traditions critiques the traditional bureaucratic planning process as a means of elite domination over the lives of the disadvantaged.

Habermas is particularly important to the rise of participatory planning, as he proposed that communicative action—“that form of social interaction in which the plans of action of different actors are coordinated through an exchange of communicative acts, that is, through a use of language oriented towards reaching understanding”—is crucial to escaping the “false rationalization” and “veiled domination” of bureaucracies and market forces in establishing a more authentic collective life (Habermas 1985: 44). Choices for development should be thoroughly discussed and deliberated in the public realm in order to properly understand the full range of possibilities for action and question the validity of dominant normative assumptions (e.g. “growth is good”).

As Innes (1998) notes, communicative participatory planning represents a profound shift from the traditional role of the planner as a bureaucrat charged with delivering “unbiased, professional advice and analysis to elected officials and the public, who in turn make decisions” (Innes 1998: 52). The planner instead becomes a facilitator helping to
empower the public with the knowledge and methods necessary to deliberate, decide, and act to improve the built environment of their own neighborhoods. This process of collaborative, communicative engagement is regarded as equally important to the actual project outcomes, as the experience generates social and intellectual capital for the community, helping to “build a civic culture in which people creatively participate in public life” (Cuthill & Fien 2005: 65).

Encouragement of a “civic culture” was indeed the intention behind New York City’s institutionalization of the 197-a planning process in 1989, an outgrowth of Mayor Robert F. Wagner’s development of the Community Board system in 1963. Examining CB9’s planning process, with twenty monthly meetings during the formulation and three larger forums thereafter to review drafts, it is clear that extensive efforts were made to engage the community and accurately represent popular opinion. During these meetings, an extensive log of participant comments was recorded and almost all of the concerns that were expressed are indeed incorporated into the plan (see appendices of CB9 and PICCED 2007). If judged without reference to the outcome of the process, community involvement in the 197-a can be characterized as “interactive participation” in Jules Pretty’s typology—“people participating in joint analysis, development of action plans, and formation or strengthening of local institutions,” with the community “taking control of local decisions…so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices” (Pretty 1995, as quoted in Cornwall 2008: 272).

However, as evidenced by the City Council’s simultaneous approval of CB9’s 197-a alongside Columbia’s proposal in December 2007, community planning in New York City currently lacks the force of law and the city government is in no way obligated to carry out the recommendations produced through this participatory process. Considering this lack of enforcement power, participation in the 197-a process must instead be classified as “participation by consultation” in Pretty’s typology—“people participating by being
consulted or by answering questions…such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making and professionals are under no obligation to take on board the people’s view” (Pretty 1995, as quoted in Cornwall 2008: 272). This type of faux-participation can have highly negative effects on a community’s social capital as it can lead to disenchantment and cynicism, reducing the community’s future capacity for political engagement (De Souza Briggs 2004). With the 197-a process meekly empowered with an “advisory” role, the door remains open for the “false rationalization and veiled domination of bureaucracies and market forces” to control the outcome of development and the future of our communities (Habermas 1985: 44).

Indeed, “false rationalization” and “veiled domination” are precisely the tactics that Columbia has employed to gain government support for their 197-c plan. Despite the university’s public proclamations of valuing a “long-term future of shared opportunity” and a “redevelopment plan crafted with community leaders” (Columbia University Digital Knowledge Ventures, 2007), a thorough examination of Columbia’s actions in developing the Manhattanville proposal reveals the university’s outreach as a condescending attempt to convince the Harlem community of the benefits of their plan rather than a good-faith effort at collaboration. During the design process, Columbia solicited no community input whatsoever, unveiling the proposal as a completed tabletop model in 2004. Property owners and community activists were aghast when they saw their neighborhood vanish from the map of this Columbia constructed future (Gonzalez 2004). Unveiling a development proposal as a completed model is a common political tactic used by developers to portray a project as a *fait accompli* to the city, the press, and potential opposition.

After releasing the completed plans, major Columbia officials attended only those
public hearings required by the city’s ULURP (Uniform Land Use Review Process)\textsuperscript{10} and ESDC’s eminent domain hearing after the ULURP was complete. At these public forums, Columbia officials would offer presentations extolling the benefits of the 197-c plan without ever moving beyond this top-down level of interaction with the community.

In his 2003 article for the New York Times “On the Heights, A Chill Wind Begins to Blow,” Denny Lee acutely observes Columbia’s divestment from authentic community participation at a very early stage in the process, locating its origins in the arrival of Lee Bollinger as President in 2002. Under Bollinger’s predecessor George Rupp (1993-2002), Columbia had made significant strides in improving its community relations, with administrator Emily Lloyd overseeing a modest program of expansion that sincerely attempted to address local concerns. For example, in constructing a new tower for faculty housing on 110\textsuperscript{th} and Broadway with a private elementary school originally intended for faculty children, Ms. Lloyd negotiated an agreement that reserved half the enrollment in the school for the local community. This mutually beneficial approach led neighborhood activists to declare with relief that “things have improved infinitely….the bulldozer is no longer their favorite weapon” (as quoted in Lee 2003). However, with Mr. Rupp’s

\textsuperscript{10} New York City’s ULURP process begins with the submission of the land use change sought, in Columbia’s case a rezoning to legally permit construction of the 197-c campus plan. After the Department of City Planning certifies the proposal, a Community Board hearing and vote is required even though the CB’s role is advisory only. The Borough President then reviews the proposal, and can hold an optional public hearing. If the BP approves the proposal, then it moves on to the City Planning Commission which is required to hold a public hearing. If CPC votes in favor, then the City Council must hold a public hearing before voting for final approval or disapproval of the land use change. (NYC DCP, 2009)
replacement by Mr. Bollinger in 2002, Emily Lloyd’s collaborative strategy was quietly phased out. As one anonymous Columbia administrator expressed it, “I sense that Emily has been demoted….Now her role has been confined to selling the expansion plan to the community” (as quoted in Lee 2003). Indeed, Bollinger has never shown a modicum of interest in honest engagement with the Harlem community. In a 2007 interview with WNYC’s Brian Lehrer, Bollinger derided the community’s 197-a plan as “not realistic” and “not helpful to the people who live there…it’s just not going to happen.”

Despite his arrogant dismissal of the community’s proposal for compromise, President Bollinger continues to proclaim a desire to “bring thriving, vital life to the surrounding communities,” and insist that “everybody who lives there will be better off….everyone is pleased with the way Columbia has dealt with them” (Lee Bollinger as quoted in Gonzalez 2004 and Williams 2006). Bollinger seems to regard the Harlem community as a group of ungrateful children who should be thankful for Columbia’s investment in their underfunded neighborhood. Beneath his disingenuous rhetoric, Bollinger’s refusal to compromise on Columbia’s unilateral ownership and design of the site is disturbingly reminiscent of former President Nicholas Murray Butler’s vision of a “unity of Morningside through ownership,” and history has shown how that President’s dream impacted Columbia’s low-income minority neighbors.

Moreover, Columbia’s paternalistic, insincere attempts at community outreach are merely the “veil” for the unmitigated economic and political power the university has exercised in order to acquire the Manhattanville site and gain political approval for the unilateral expansion plan. Soon after Bollinger’s arrival, Columbia began to aggressively purchase real estate in the Manhattanville site footprint. While some owners willingly sold to the university, others who were not as eager to relocate allege that Columbia used its position as a powerful, prestigious university to threaten and coerce them into selling. John Busch,
who owned a boiler repair business on West 130th street, claims that the university blackmailed him by threatening condemnation with minimal compensation. Faced with this explicit threat of losing his property to eminent domain, Busch felt he had “no choice” but to sell—“How are you going to fight them? They teach lawyers!” (as quoted in Gonzalez 2004).

Anne Whitman, the owner of Hudson Moving & Storage, received a letter from the university threatening that it would be “impossible” for her business to remain in the area (Williams 2006). Whitman however, not as easily cowed as Busch, was initially determined to maintain the business she had inherited from her father. Columbia continued to apply pressure, with Bollinger slandering Ms. Whitman as an “outside business interest” selfishly obstructing the progress of the expansion, despite the fact that she was an active member of CB9 (Kent 2007). Only last year after Columbia’s plans were fully approved by the ULURP process did Ms. Whitman finally agree to sell and relocate to Washington Heights, leaving Mr. Sprayregen and the Singh family, whom own two gas stations in the footprint, as the remaining holdouts.

In addition to the intimidation of property owners, Columbia has also deployed its economic and political might to aggressively lobby the city and state government to support the expansion plan. According to New York Times reporter Timothy Williams (2007), whose discerning work I have cited throughout this paper, Columbia has spent nearly $1.2 million dollars to enlist some of the city’s most powerful lobbying firms to push for the rezoning and eminent domain powers necessary for the Manhattanville plan to become a reality. These firms have targeted the city’s most influential elected officials and power brokers including former Deputy Mayor for Economic Development Dan Doctoroff, Council Speaker Christine Quinn, Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, and Councilmember Robert Jackson (who represents Manhattanville and Hamilton Heights).

Among the lobbying firms Columbia has recruited for this effort is Bill Lynch
Associates. Bill Lynch, a former vice-chair of the Democratic National Committee and campaign manager for John Kerry, is known in New York as a “political fixer” and is one of the most well-connected lobbyists in the city (Schuerman 2007, Schrodt 2007). One of Mr. Lynch’s most important tasks was to organize a community group called the “Coalition for the Future of Manhattanville” by which he would deliver an “authentic” presence of Harlem supporters for Columbia’s plan at public hearings. In addition to Bill Lynch’s work, former Mayor David Dinkins has constantly leveraged his credibility and influence on behalf of Bollinger and could often be found directly at the President’s side during the public hearings required by New York’s ULURP procedures. He too is on Columbia’s payroll, as a Professor of Public Policy (Williams 2008).

In the face of this overwhelming deployment of political and economic power, it is not surprising that Columbia was able to steamroll its plan through the ULURP process despite the vehement objections of CB9 and other Harlem activists. New York City’s land use regime, where undemocratic, appointed bureaucracies like the City Planning Commission and ESDC are endowed with extraordinary powers while the Community Boards exist as mere advisory bodies, has long been structurally susceptible to manipulation by well-connected developers like Columbia University. The lack of accountability and transparency effectively filters democracy out of the decision making process to the advantage of those with economic and political power. As Councilman Tony Avella points out, by the time Columbia’s proposal arrived for debate at the City Council “the fix” already appeared to be in. Despite seven hours of public testimony and the concurrent submission of the 197-a plan,
"Columbia’s idea to utterly change forever 17 acres in West Harlem was not amended in any way, shape, or form at the City Council level" (Avella 2008). As long as Community Boards and 197-a planning continue to lack legal authority, these participatory processes will remain dependant on the good-will of city government and powerful developers to recognize the value of their “advice,” an especially dubious proposition when the constituency in question is a historically disadvantaged minority community like West Harlem.

Indeed, in the case of Columbia’s expansion, *Tuck-it-Away et al vs. New York State Urban Development Corporation* has exposed evidence that beginning in 2004, ESDC and the city’s Economic Development Corporation actively colluded with Columbia in a secret backroom agreement to support the project with the state power of eminent domain. According to the majority opinion written by Judge James Catterson, the ESDC and EDC tacitly allowed Columbia to intentionally blight its Manhattanville properties by vacating tenants and failing to perform basic maintenance (*Tuck it Away et al*, 28-29). ESDC then used the same private consultant whom had previously been a client of Columbia’s to conduct the environmental evaluation of Manhattanville’s conditions. According to Judge Catterson, ESDC’s “blight designation is mere sophistry. It was utilized by ESDC years after the scheme was hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain…the record overwhelmingly establishes that the true beneficiary of the scheme to redevelop
Manhattanville is not the community that is supposedly blighted, but rather Columbia University, a private elite educational institution “(Tuck it Away et al, 27, 34). What is most outrageous is that all of this backroom collusion between the state, city, and Columbia was occurring at the very same time that the city was publicly encouraging CB9 to compose its alternative community plan for the area.

The Tuck it Away et al ruling is remarkable for its candor in assessing the Columbia project as a corrupt bargain by elite interests rather than a civic renewal program, echoing what many Harlem activists have been arguing for years. Indeed, in examining Columbia’s relationship with the Harlem community during the Manhattanville planning process, it is clear that under President Bollinger, the only thing that has changed since the days of “Gym Crow” is that the university’s domination is now veiled in a beguiling rhetoric of political correctness. If Judge Catterson’s ruling is upheld at the New York State Court of Appeals, a monumental blow will be struck against top-down elite mega-projects in New York, and another black mark will be added to Columbia’s long history of inequitable development policies.

Conclusion: The Columbia Expansion and the Future of New York City

While the historically discriminatory and exploitative relationship between Columbia and Harlem and the anti-democratic nature of the city’s planning process are crucial factors in analyzing Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion plans, this analysis would be incomplete without reference to the larger patterns of development that have predominated in New York City during recent decades.

Columbia’s justification for the expansion is that the university must grow in order to be able to compete as an elite research institution in the 21st century global economy. Considering this rationale it is not surprising that New York has gone to extraordinary lengths to back the university’s plan despite the Harlem community’s objections, for the city has
explicitly pursued a strategy of developing Manhattan as an elite “command and control”
center of the global economy since the 1980’s (Hyra 2008: 53). Billions of dollars in
subsidies have been funneled to encourage multi-national corporations to locate and invest in
New York and to help real estate developers build the glistening residential and commercial
towers they require (Fainstein 2001, Moody 2007). Manhattan has become one of the
premier “corporate service complexes” in the global economy, with large numbers of
financiers, lawyers, accountants, advertising professionals, and other highly skilled service
workers employed and residing on the island. President Bollinger is not shy about his
ambition to ensure that “from its location in the nation’s most global city, Columbia excels as
a truly global university” (CU Office of the President, 2008).

However, Saskia Sassen (2001) points out the dark side of this single-minded
concentration on developing New York as an elite enclave of the global economy—the
growth of extreme social stratification and the displacement of poor and working class New
Yorkers to the city’s periphery. Along with the high-skill, high-pay service jobs, this model of
development creates myriad low-wage jobs in the low-skill service industry—the janitorial,
security, food-preparation, and retail positions that support the existence of the elite firms and
high-wage workers. This simultaneous demand for high-wage and low-wage work, combined
with the elimination of manufacturing in the central city as the real estate becomes far more
valuable for high-end commercial and residential uses, creates a bifurcated labor market and
exacerbates social and spatial segregation by class and race. Derek Hyra (2008) has called
this pattern the “New Urban Renewal” as historically divested, low-income, minority
neighborhoods like Harlem in New York and Bronzeville in Chicago are suddenly flooded
with investment through a combination of these global economic forces and city policies that
target this investment at “under-developed” but centrally located areas.

Columbia’s seizure of 17 acres of West Harlem for construction of a new research
campus clearly represents an extension of the overall development of Manhattan as an elite enclave of the global economy, an iteration of this “new urban renewal.” Indeed, reacting to the December ruling against ESDC and Columbia in *Tuck it Away et al*, Kathryn S. Wylde, chief executive of the Partnership for New York City—one of New York’s leading elite business groups—frankly stated “I think it’s frightening because there are few more important investments in our city’s future than that which Columbia is making” (as quoted in Pristin, 2010).

The future envisioned by elites like Ms. Wylde does not include the presence of working-class, low-income minorities and immigrants in Harlem. The massive investment of a $6.28 billion dollar facility in a neighborhood that has been historically excluded from the economic prosperity of mainstream society (due in great part to Columbia’s employment of the “old” urban renewal as the history reveals) will undoubtedly cause massive secondary displacement and exacerbate social stratification. Columbia proudly proclaims that the expansion will create as many as 6,000 new jobs for the community, but for a community with low-educational attainment these jobs will be service sector positions that will not pay high enough to cover the rising cost of living in West Harlem. Thousands of people will be forced to relocate to peripheral areas in the outer boroughs and inner suburbs with fewer social services, economic opportunities, and less public transportation service, a pattern that is already occurring throughout the New York metropolitan area (Hyra 2008: 164-166)

I believe it is long past due that the City and powerful institutions and corporations step back and take a closer look at the holistic implications of this mode of development that is not only inequitable and anti-democratic in its displacement and alienation of low-income minority communities but also unsustainable in its concentration on developing an elite consumer economy. As described above, the Manhattanville site is one of the last manufacturing zones in all of Manhattan and was growing in small manufacturing firms
before Columbia began to acquire the real estate. Rather than the remnants of a bygone industrial era, small-scale specialized manufacturers are, as Schuerman points out, “an essential link in supply chains to other businesses around the city” in addition to being a crucial source of well-paying jobs for immigrants and minorities (Schuerman 2007: 130-131). Industry diversifies the tax base, providing an invaluable protection against downturns in the global economy. Indeed, the current financial crisis has vividly proved the near-term dangers inherent in the city’s over-emphasis on development as an elite global service and consumption economy. Industrial zones are also needed to develop the “green collar jobs” in green construction/retrofitting and adaptive manufacture of waste materials into new products (Friedman 2009). To adequately address the advantages of a diversified local economy in terms of long-term environmental sustainability would require another paper entirely.

Of course, none of these crucial issues of equity and sustainability were adequately addressed during the Manhattanville planning process because the city’s land use policies do not allow a forum for true democratic deliberation. Any activist, community group, or dissident politician who critiques the drive for raw economic growth of the globally oriented economy is rejected as “irrational” and excluded from the discussion, as seen in the city’s dismissal of CB9’s 197-a plan. As Habermas asserts, establishing true democratic forums where discussion of the underlying values and range of potential options can occur is the only way to arrive at truly rational outcome.

It is time for New York to recognize that the persistence of an undemocratic planning regime that produces developments like the Columbia expansion is sowing the seeds for a 21st century city that will continue to be plagued by inequity, racial segregation, economic instability, environmental degradation, and social upheaval. As Community Board 9’s 197-a plan for Manhattanville illustrates, the alternative for development that integrates people and
place and produces solutions that can balance the growth of the city as a global center with the realities of local society is not a mere pipe-dream. New York must embrace the community planning alternative and empower the process with the force of law if we are to move forward to a new era of greater democracy and sustainable economic development that benefits all New Yorkers.
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