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**Hegemony and Rights: On the Liberal Justification for Empire**

Just as the "civilizing mission" of bringing Christianity to the heathen provided a justifying pretext for the imperialist conquest of Asia and Africa in the past, today the protection of "human rights" may be the cloak for a new type of imperialist military intervention worldwide. ... [It] also distracts from active criticism of global economic structures that favor the basic human rights abuse of a world split between staggering wealth and dire poverty.—Diana Johnston, "Seeing Yugoslavia Through a Dark Glass"

Violations of human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any other. Human rights ... will have to be vindicated ... by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door to aggression and destroying the principal advance of international law, the outlawing of war and the prohibition of force.—Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave*

Throughout much of the twentieth century, the idea of a liberal imperialism, or of a liberal argument for neo-imperial hegemony, would have seemed absurd. The reason for this is that twenty-first-century liberalism developed during the same period in which so-called national liberation movements emerged in the third world, so that liberal theorists largely accepted some
version of a principle of self-determination, a core idea for those movements. The suggestion that a state might legitimately play a hegemonic, imperial, or, above all, colonial role in the world was anathema to those who espoused liberal ideas.

Yet in the nineteenth century, liberalism had been closely associated with empires, particularly the British Empire. Key liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton explicitly endorsed some version of imperialism. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there seems to be a guarded renewal of this liberal espousal of imperial goals. This is most apparent in Great Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair—and more explicitly the British diplomat Robert Cooper—have advocated a global interventionism by the United Kingdom and the United States (i.e., “the West”) reminiscent of the nineteenth-century British Empire.1 Perhaps this historical legacy has enabled politicians there to be more open about the nature of contemporary imperialism than is the case in the United States.

In any event, as Niall Ferguson has emphasized, the contemporary world seems to have witnessed a new (US) imperialism that is comparable to empires from the past.2 But can it be justified in liberal terms—or is it, as some might contend, just a feature of the overwhelming power of a globally dominant state? In this essay, I seek to show that there is indeed a (contemporary) liberal argument to be made for empire—though only if both liberalism and imperialism are understood in certain ways. This argument can be found in part in a number of contemporary thinkers; but I am more interested in examining the best possible version of such an argument, whether or not it has been made in its entirety by any one philosopher or politician. Furthermore, I want also, having constructed such an argument, to criticize it—to show why empire is ultimately not justifiable in liberal terms. What the implications of this are—whether imperialism or liberalism or both are to be abandoned—I leave for the conclusion.

The liberal argument consists of four steps; I will examine them in the next four sections, leading up to an assessment of the practical consequences of the argument and a consideration of alternatives to it. First, the term hegemony must be substituted for empire in order to make the latter palatable for contemporary liberal sensibilities. Second, liberalism must be defined as entailing a political project to be realized on a global scale. Third, this project is to be equated with a new concept of human rights that replaces the traditional practice of emergency humanitarian relief. Fourth, this human-rights agenda is viewed as realizable only through a scheme of global governance, that is, of governmental institutions capable of the global enforcement of norms. A conclusion is reached when the hegemonic state is appealed to as a stand-in for the (unrealizable) project of establishing such effective global governing institutions.

The question to ask about this line of argument is whether it is a necessary progression, or whether there is nothing inherently imperialistic about liberal ideas. I will argue that there is such a conceptual logic embedded within liberalism (or at least a currently dominant version of it) and that avoiding the conclusion to which this reasoning leads requires either drastically restricting or abandoning liberal theory as it is generally understood. But a prior contextual question needs brief consideration: what is the importance of a liberal argument for empires when liberalism seems to have been decisively abandoned by the very empire under consideration?

In the era of wars on terrorism and dictatorship, does liberal imperialism—even if it could be said to exist—have any relevance? Here, the political shift at the end of the 1990s in the United States seems to have ended whatever liberal hegemony there might have been. The discourse of (economic) globalization that marked much of the Clinton era in the United States has been replaced by the more militaristic discourse of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. This shift looks like a fundamental one; yet it may not be. Has the liberal rhetoric of democratization and human rights really been abandoned? And how different is the neoliberal agenda of the Clinton years from the neoconservative project of the current administration?

As Neil Smith argues in his book The Endgame of Globalization, there has been a fundamental continuity of goals in US governments over the past several decades (including the present one). Whether these goals are stated in the internationalist language of rights and liberties or the nationalist language of state interests, “both are the fruit of the classical liberal tradition.”3 There is less difference than may at first be apparent between the Clinton-era policies that emphasized international agreements—often engineered through global agencies such as the World Trade Organization (backed by US diplomacy when necessary)—and the current policies of military threats and interventions, from Afghanistan to Iraq (and beyond).
Certainly, this is true at least ideologically (and that is my main concern here): recent US interventions have been justified by much the same discourse of human rights, democracy, and freedom that was used in the 1990s to argue for everything from trade liberalization to sanctions (and eventually interventions) against recalcitrant regimes from Iraq (again) to Yugoslavia. This point has been documented by Julie Mertus, who shows that after the initial rhetorical use of terms such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to argue for an intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration has resorted to the same liberal justifications (particularly utilizing the concept of human rights) voiced by the Clinton administration in previous years.3

EMPIRE OR HEGEMONY?

It seems that liberal arguments for US actions abroad are not so easily discarded. So we need to consider how such arguments might be employed in an explicit (and general) justification of empires, rather than in just defending specific actions that a globally dominant state such as the United States has taken. The first step, as previously mentioned, is to replace talk of empires with that of hegemonic states. These terms need not be synonymous and have at times denoted importantly distinct entities. Michael Doyle, for instance, contrasts the ancient Greek states of Athens and Sparta, with Athens regarded as explicitly imperialistic and Sparta as hegemonic only. The difference lies in the degree of interference that the imperial or hegemonic power exercises on subordinate countries. The imperial power will be involved in ordering the internal social institutions of subject peoples (tax policy, property law, religious practices), while the hegemonic power will simply dictate external policy (diplomatic alliances, trade pacts, military deployments). Today, liberal schemes of global governance in theory are at most hegemonic, attempting to influence states (or more strongly, force them) to abide by certain international standards of rights, development, governance, and so on. In practice, however, such attempts often become more intrusive, breaking down any distinction between internal and external policies.

Furthermore, a burgeoning historical literature has shown how the United States, in replacing the colonial empires of England and France, developed an innovative set of institutions designed to establish an “informal empire,” that is, one without colonies. The uniqueness of this informal empire — what historians have more traditionally referred to as hegemony — should not, however, be exaggerated. As Ferguson has mentioned, the hundreds of US military bases around the world today — what Chalmers Johnson has called an “empire of bases” — are remarkably similar, in both geographical location and political purpose, to the system of British Royal Navy stations a century ago.7

But even if the United States had become in the twentieth century, as did England in the century before, an (informal) imperial power, why is this not simply a fact of modern history or geopolitics, without ideological or philosophical significance? After all, does not the US reluctance to take on the trappings of a formal empire itself indicate an embarrassment about the nature of imperialism that was all but universal by the mid-twentieth century? As indicated above, if this embarrassment existed in the immediate postcolonial era, it now shows signs of waning in the years following the end of the Cold War (i.e., after 1990). There is increasingly a confluence between this historical watershed and a coterminous change in the political philosophy of liberalism, and it is this confluence that has led to the renewed possibility of a future for liberal imperialism.

Before turning to this new version of liberal theory, a moment should be devoted to recalling the prior life of liberal imperialism at the height of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. The leading advocates for imperialism at this time — John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton — made similar arguments in their writings from the 1860s, though with different emphases.

Acton regarded empires as examples of what we would today call multicultural communities — states in which different peoples could live in relative harmony (his examples were the Austrian and the British Empires).8 To advocate empires as a form of rule was to be freed from a dangerous delusion of the age — that peoples could find self-determination within nation-states. Rather, they ought to accept an imperial framework that gave them material benefits while protecting them from the civil wars and ethnic cleansing entailed by conflicts between national groups.

Mill, in contrast, seemed to view empires as temporary institutions, ones designed to help backward peoples in their progress toward civilization, that is, toward the creation of institutions of representative government.9 As Uday Mehta has emphasized, it is the belief in the desirability — and the possibility — of progress toward civilization that informs Mill’s (and other liberals’) ad-
Empires have a crucial role to play in tutoring peoples without progressive political institutions in the knowledge of what is required to establish them.

Today, Acton’s view of empires has few adherents, among other reasons because such multinational empires as he favored (Great Britain and Austria, but also perhaps the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) have seemed either actually oppressive themselves, or, when not, unable to quiet the ethnonational strife to which they have often been subject. Mill’s concept, however, may be more relevant to the so-called new imperialism. The rhetoric of democracy and freedom (e.g., in US-occupied Iraq) is again playing a role in justifying interventions and occupations by the United States. But how can imperialism be regarded as liberal in view of its obviously oppressive features? Understanding this requires a brief consideration of what liberalism has come to mean in the current context.

**IS IMPERIALISM NECESSARILY ENTAILED BY CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM?**

One way to get at the connections between liberal theory and imperial politics is to ask whether contemporary liberalism still embodies a concept of progress that might entail state intervention in and administration of nonprogressive countries, as Mill thought was sometimes necessary. There are actually two questions here: is the concept of progress still implicit in contemporary liberalism, and, if so, does liberalism mandate foreign interventions (and perhaps occupations) to achieve this progress? Here the concept of hegemony, and its divergence from empires such as such, is important. Liberal imperialists seek to justify not a colonial regime, or even a strictly imperial one, but one that is hegemonic, provided this hegemony is used to institutionalize liberal values. The fact that in a postcolonial world, direct justifications of empires are largely discredited does not mean that an indirect justification might not be considered legitimate when viewed as a last resort. If empire is not considered a fully legitimate form of political authority, due to its inherently undemocratic character, it may still be viewed as a means, under certain conditions, of creating a liberal society when such a society does not exist in a given country (i.e., one ruled by an oppressive and/or dictatorial regime).

Turning to the first question, it is true that there has been much recent discussion about whether core liberal values are supposedly Western or trans-cultural. This debate, especially as it is focused on the nature of human rights, suggests that contemporary liberalism may have disanced itself from the nineteenth-century progressivism of Mill. But in fact the debate has shown a surprising resilience in affirmations of the universality of liberal values (above all, human rights), even in the face of skeptical or relativist doubts.11

What has actually been more up for debate is how to justify and categorize human rights. In the first case, constructivist theories that refer to a historical project of universalizing the legal rights recognized in European countries have tended to predominate over naturalist theories that identify rights as features of human agency.12 In the second case, there has been contention between minimalists and maximalists interpretations of rights, with the former emphasizing basic rights and the latter maintaining the existence of socioeconomic rights, as well as the less controversial (basic) rights to life, liberty, personal property, and legal equality.13

These debates need not detain us from adopting a basic definition of human rights that can be instrumentalized internationally, and this is the goal of most liberal theorists today. It is crucial to note that traditional definitions of liberalism emphasizing, for example, personal liberties, private property, or religious toleration have been largely folded into the idea of human rights by late twentieth-century liberals. Human rights, on this view, can be defined as high-priority claims to the conditions for personal moral agency.14

Two features of this definition are noteworthy and get us to the second question of whether liberal theory does still mandate international interventions to realize its conception of social progress. First, human rights are applicable primarily in those places where a legal system does not already recognize rights as just defined. Elsewhere, the human-rights doctrine of contemporary liberalism functions as an attempt to establish the “right to have rights.”15 Second, there is an ambiguity built into the idea of rights, which originated, after all, as a legal concept. Are human rights essentially moral or political entitlements? The difference lies in whether human rights are foundational (ethical) norms, ones that do not mandate any particular actions—or are norms of political behavior that can be instrumentalized by states or other agents (e.g., international or nongovernmental organizations).

This brings us to the second question of whether liberalism requires state actions globally in the name of progress, that is, the realization of human
rights. Since the universalistic nature of liberalism virtually makes all liberals cosmopolitans—that is, believers in the idea that all persons have equal value (and therefore, rights)—the difference adumbrated above is one between moral and political cosmopolitans. Moral cosmopolitans are those who, while they espouse liberal values such as human rights, resist the temptation (as they would see it) to use the diplomatic or military power of states or other international actors to realize these values directly. Political cosmopolitans, in contrast, disagree with the idea that the state—including hegemonic states—should not be utilized to realize these values.

It is political cosmopolitanism, in my view, that opens the way to a liberal justification of empires. More is required for such an argument to be made. But the initial step involves a commitment to some political scheme—for instance, a more robust form of international organization—that can instantiate cosmopolitan values (in particular, human rights). Some philosophers, such as Thomas Pogge, use the concept of a global social contract to argue that the values of liberalism (distributive justice, representative democracy, and especially human rights) should be institutionalized globally through the acceptance of universally agreed norms by existing states or peoples. Others, such as Peter Singer, who argues from a quasi-utilitarian position, argue that cosmopolitan values—which are conducive to the interests of mankind generally—will remain unrealized until some more equitable scheme of “global governance” is established. But the idea that a moral scheme of human rights requires some institutional embodiment is essential to the political cosmopolitan view—contractualist, utilitarian, or otherwise. What sort of institutions will do the trick? Certainly, most political cosmopolitans would reject the idea of using an imperial-hegemonic state as a means of realizing their ideals; few liberals would openly endorse a scheme that traduced the principle of self-government.

But they need not do so. For once the question is asked of how to institutionalize the enforcement of human rights, the achievement of democratic constitutions, or a global redistribution of income, the answer must be that it is done through the actions of some political entity greater or stronger or more authoritative than most states existing today. Of course, such an institution must be committed to cosmopolitan ideals, or at least potentially committed to them. At first, talk of states need not occur—the United Nations or some

less compromised ideal international organization is sufficient. But before long, in the face of the manifest unrealizability of all such entities, the state—that is, the hegemonic state—will become the second (or last) choice of political cosmopolitans. I want to look at this conceptual slide toward empire in some more detail with regard to the problem of human rights in particular. A similar process could be seen in discussions of cosmopolitan democracy or of international distributive justice; but the human rights context is a particularly fraught one since it has been invoked in a number of recent international conflicts (Yugoslavia, Central Africa, the Middle East), either where interventions by hegemonic states have occurred or where various philosophers think they ought to have occurred.

FROM HUMANITARIANISM TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Recent discussions of the politics of human rights have been caught up by terminological confusions over the difference between humanitarianism and human rights, the “old” versus the “new” humanitarianism, and so on. Underlying this confusion are differing interpretations of the history of the idea of human rights. The crucial moment was that of the creation of the United Nations and the writing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the late 1940s. From this point, human rights definitively entered the discourse of international relations; yet the meaning and significance of such rights remained unclear. The key issue was the relation between human-rights claims and state sovereignty. Yet as Michael Ignatieff, among others, has noted, the relation between these has never been worked out in international law and in fact embodies a clear contradiction between different principles: “The human rights covenants that states have signed since 1945 have implied that state sovereignty is conditional . . . yet this conditionality has never been made explicit in international law.”

In the three to four decades after 1950, human rights tended to be subordinate to humanitarian actions such as famine relief that did not challenge the sovereignty doctrine. This humanitarianism opted for a stance of neutrality in relation to warring or tyrannical states and was aimed primarily at the amelioration of suffering in emergencies. While human rights remained a regulative ideal within international law, it did not have—as humanitarianism seemed to—any readily available embodiment other than moral exhortation.
Starting in the 1980s, however, and gathering strength in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, a new view of humanitarian emergencies arose that regarded them as violations of human rights, justifying political remedies, possibly including military actions. Advocates of this view sometimes saw the concept of human rights as further humanizing international law, including the part dealing with humanitarian actions in wartime. As Theodor Meron has written, to genuinely humanize international law, including the law of war, would be to “put an end to all kinds of armed conflict.” Failing this, human rights could be used to extend and potentially universalize the humanitarian impulse, including, crucially, in intrastate conflicts (i.e., civil wars).

Other advocates of extending the human-rights doctrine have viewed this extension as a return to a perspective they saw embodied in the un and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—an antitotalitarian perspective that regarded human rights as a weapon in the fight against, first, fascism, and then other forms of antihumanitarian ideologies (communism, nationalism, fundamentalism, and so on). Alain Destexhe, for instance, attacked what he called the “new humanitarianism” for forgetting that “the construction of a world order and the development of the un after the Second World War have been guided by a principle: never again. The Nazis’ unprecedented crime against the Jews became a benchmark for an international community founded on certain basic values: opposition to genocide, the search for world peace and respect for human rights.” Instead, “today, from Bosnia to Rwanda, the new humanitarianism or the emergency ethic has rebounded on the victims. They are now seen in terms of their immediate suffering rather than as fellow human beings.”

The task, for these critics of humanitarianism, is to get back to a political advocacy of human rights in general, not just for the victims of tyrannical regimes but for all persons. Humanitarian emergencies, in this view, are the result of more deep-seated problems that can only be successfully addressed by an aggressive human rights–oriented international community. Humanitarian problems, in other words, “cannot be solved by humanitarian means alone.”

Another view, by contrast, sees consistency between the Universal Declaration and more recent (“new humanitarian”) measures to redress emergency suffering. This consistency is embodied by the paramount value of peace in international law—a paramourcy only reinforced by the development of the un and the adoption of the Universal Declaration. The great departure in practice was not perpetrated by the humanitarian relief agencies that worked in the decades following World War II, but by the nongovernmental organizations dedicated to human rights that now seek to use political means to address humanitarian emergencies. This, as David Rieff, for instance, has written, is the real new humanitarianism—relief policies predicated on taking sides, getting politically involved with one or another state or movement that is willing to sponsor relief.

The most illustrative case of the turn away from humanitarianism to a militant human-rights approach is that of Bernard Kouchner. At one time head of one of the most respected humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, Doctors without Borders (dwa), Kouchner eventually resigned because of dwa’s refusal to breach its long-standing policy of neutrality between actors in political conflicts (in this case, Yugoslavia). Kouchner ended up as head of the un-sponsored administration of Kosovo, overseeing a NATO/US occupation of that region after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army.

Two issues are central to an assessment of these differing perspectives on humanitarianism and human rights activism: (1) the value of neutrality for humanitarian organizations; and (2) the relation between humanitarian emergencies and military interventions. The view of the new human rights activists is that humanitarian organizations can never be neutral. In fact, they argue, attempts at neutrality actually play into the hands of the perpetrators of emergencies by giving them an excuse to act with impunity—since someone else (the NGOs) will deal with the consequences. Furthermore, humanitarian work can only be effective if it becomes politically savvy—takes sides, condemns the perpetrators of atrocities, and fights for a political solution to the conflict. Otherwise, the aid workers (for instance) find themselves to be pawns in the hands of other political agents in conflicts—and willingly so, in order to gain access to the worst-off victims of these conflicts.

The solution: become willing pawns in the hands of the international community (e.g., Kouchner and the US protectorate in Kosovo). If neutrality is a hard policy to maintain, partisanship sacrifices any ability to ameliorate the situation other than through the clear victory and dominance of one or another party to the conflict. For NGOs that forego neutrality, all their efforts are now dependent on the success, usually military, of one side. So war and occupation are now the solution to humanitarian emergencies.
This brings us to the second issue: how can war be a humanitarian solution when it is the greatest humanitarian disaster conceivable? Only a consequentialist willing to weigh the relative costs of life and death for scores of victims and potential victims of such wars or interventions could claim such a thing. Yet such calculations must be long-term ones since interventions end, while wars and their sequels can continue almost indefinitely. How can anyone calculate with confidence that some wrongdoing now will definitely result in lives saved later? Alternatively, interventions may not end (for a long time, anyway), and the new humanitarians may find themselves administering a colony of the international community that in turn must repress those within it—sometimes violating their human rights—in order to maintain control.

These quandaries suggest what the more traditional human-rights advocates view as a truism—that war is the chief cause of the loss of people’s human rights in the long term and the greatest of humanitarian disasters in the short term. This is why Louis Henkin writes that

> clearly, it was the original intent of the [UN] Charter to forbid the use of force even to promote human rights... Nothing has happened to justify deviations from that commitment. Human rights are indeed violated in every country... But the use of force remains itself... the most serious... violation of human rights. It should not be justified by any claim that it is necessary to safeguard other human rights.

The connection of the new humanitarian/human-rights activism to a renascent imperialism should now begin to come clear. It is, of course, in some sense, an old story, recalling the connection between nineteenth-century colonialism and the missionaries and abolitionists active at that time. But there is a new aspect to the contemporary dilemmas of humanitarianism, having to do with a widely shared commitment to democratic legitimacy in the twentieth century. If human rights are going to be a partisan political project of states, it ought to have the assent of the peoples in whose name such states act. Yet this is rarely the case. The most important instance of such assent seems to be the European Union, which has institutionalized human rights commitments. But this is largely beside the point, since such commitments apply only to member peoples and are not the basis for actions taken toward (or on) other peoples—something for which the EU has been criticized by interventionist human rights activists.

Almost by definition, _international_ (or, if you prefer, _universal_) human rights cannot have political legitimacy in any straightforward sense—either through some form of democratic consent or by way of constitutional ratification. In either case, they cease to be international or universal, applying only to that people or peoples who have consented to or ratified them. But the point is to apply them to others who do not have such rights—or the chance to adopt them. We therefore get the unrepresentative, unaccountable agencies of NGOs and the international community attempting to represent those lacking such rights as they supposedly have. This raises problems with the very idea of human rights that we need not go into here. But such an advocate of politicized human rights as Michael Ignatieff acknowledges the contradiction with attempting to provide human rights for those who lack them: “If human rights principles exist to validate individual agency and collective rights of self-rule, then human rights practice is obliged to seek consent for its norms and to abstain from interference when consent is not freely given.”

Another way to put this is that if human rights are to have legitimacy—in other words, to become positive law within countries—they must be institutionalized by peoples themselves, not imposed by the international community. Such impositions, however cloaked in the language of human equality, violate a fundamental political right—that of self-determination—just as surely as military interventions to achieve these results violate the fundamental right to life of the victims of such interventions. How, we might ask, do human-rights activists avoid the obvious link between their rights advocacy and the imperial implications of utilizing hegemonic states to realize their goals?

In the case of Ignatieff, who has advocated military interventions for humanitarian purposes, it is done by acceding _some_ legitimacy to sovereignty as a principle in international law. But it is of course a conditional principle—conditional on respecting human rights. Once violated, state sovereignty may be overridden if certain criteria are met. These criteria, which I will examine in more detail below, play the role of protecting interventions from the _immediate_ suspicion of imperial designs. It turns out that humanitarian interventions are acceptable—are not imperialist, despite their appearances—if they are _temporary_. For instance, the intervention(s) by NATO into Yugoslavia are not imperialist if they do not result in permanent occupation (protectorates).

But, as David Chandler has pointed out, the reason that such interventions
occurs in the first place is that the human-rights activists regard the indigenous
states as untrustworthy or worse. The “humanitarian impulse” is therefore
“transformed into a framework of long-term involvement, assistance, and
capacity-building.” As a result, humanitarian interventions end up “subor-
dinating universal humanitarian needs to selective political ends.”
Furthermore, denying that such interventions by the international community are
imperialist is to overlook the changes in the nature of empire that have re-
sulted from twentieth-century developments in law, acculturation, and war-
fare. These developments have altered the debate about empires and their
legitimacy, not in terms of underlying principles, but in terms of the forms
such empires might take.

LIBERAL IMPERIALISM AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Today, it is the belief not in permanent colonies or even protectorates that is
imperialist, but in the necessity of a system of global governance by which the
international community enforces its norms. Advocates of global governance
come in at least two varieties—the so-called cosmopolitan democracy school of
David Held and Daniele Archibugi, among others, and the “one-worlders”
such as Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge. Critics of global-governance schemes
tend to want to reform international law in such a way as to leave intact, though
modified, some principle of state sovereignty. This is the view both of some
human-rights jurists such as Louis Henkin, and of political philosophers, of
whom John Rawls, in his work on the “law of peoples,” is the best known. The
debate between these two positions reconstitutes the debate over the meaning
of cosmopolitanism (whether it is moral only or also has political forms) in more
concrete terms.

The views of the critics suggest that any modification of international law
that opens the door to military interventions in sovereign states (except per-
haps in dire emergencies) has gone too far along the road toward undermin-
ing the primary desideratum of international law—world peace. Henkin, for
instance, has argued that the primary purpose (and achievement) of inter-
national law in the twentieth century has been to circumscribe the right of states
to wage war for their own purposes. Allowing states to make their own judg-
ments about whether others have violated human rights opens the door to
justifying conflicts between states, rather than rendering them illegitimate.

This is so even in the case of states sponsoring terrorism against others—
military interventions or attacks against such states are not acceptable.

International law, in this view, is a system of norms to be acted on through
persuasion and exhortation, not instrumentalized through enforcement me-
chanisms that inevitably will involve the discretionary determination of reasons
for war by self-interested states. The history of claims of rights violations by
others inevitably includes not only supposedly enlightened or civilized states
that have enshrined such rights in their own constitutions but also states—
notoriously including Nazi Germany in the 1930s—with long-standing ter-
ritorial and other designs on neighboring countries. In such cases, the idea
that rights violations provided sufficient reason for military actions against
other states also provided a rationale for imperialist expansion, the establish-
ment of puppet states, colonies, protectorates, and so forth.

Even when international law is deemed ripe for reform, if it is to be kept as
the primary instantiation of human-rights doctrines, the actions permissible
on the basis of failure to fulfill such doctrines must be strictly circumscribed.
This is one reason why Rawls’s Law of Peoples has met with such skepticism or
criticism from other liberal philosophers—because Rawls does advocate such
limits, and it is these limits that make it hard for the international community
to force states to conform to liberal (especially human-rights) doctrines. Rawls
uses the idea of “decent” societies as ones that, while not liberal—and perhaps
not abiding by an expanded list of human rights—nevertheless are legitimate
actors in international relations and worthy of respect under international
law. Such societies may not be democratic—they may even be theocratic.
But as long as they do not commit the most egregious violations of basic rights,
they are considered legitimate, at least internationally. This distinction is
quite out of favor with many liberals today because they want to extend their
doctrines and schemes universally, by virtually any means necessary. It is this
matter of how to institutionalize liberal doctrines, especially those of human
rights, that makes liberal internationalists at least potential imperialists.

There are two ways in which such a view gets expressed. On the one hand,
there are those who advocate comprehensive, universal schemes of global
justice, often including some notion of human rights, and that therefore need
to provide some idea as to how such schemes might be actualized. On the
other hand, there are those who advocate a global governance scheme for its
own sake, that is, so that certain specifically political values may be realized on a global scale.

In the first case, the idea is that conceptions of human rights (for instance) are essentially universal and therefore require universal political institutions to realize them across the globe. This is a popular idea with those who in particular advocate schemes of global resource or income redistribution, often based on a right to a minimum income. For them, global governance may begin with a “value overlap” (embodied in “ethical dialogue”) between different, like-minded countries. These can serve as a nucleus for an ever-expanding array of states that have endorsed such rights. Of course, this immediately raises a question about the relation of these countries to those who do not endorse such rights—a question these liberal theorists are sometimes reluctant to answer.

Alternatively, global governance may take the form of revised and strengthened international institutions, above all the UN. These institutions would then be in a position to enforce global norms. This view takes it for granted that the weakened role of the UN and other international institutions in recent years—and their increasing subservience to US foreign policy objectives—is a fact of no essential importance. What, then, remains is to ask how much progress could be made to create such institutions of global governance. The answer is that though, to date, there is little evidence of their practicability or probability, such institutions are not impossible and, in any case, are morally mandated.

But perhaps the good of global governance lies not in its instrumental value but in its basis as itself a human right, for instance, to self-rule. This is the view of the cosmopolitan democrats who advocate democratizing institutions such as the UN. The chief problem with this view is that it avoids facing the primary fact about such institutions—not their undemocratic nature, but their weakness in the face of the hegemonic dominance of the United States. Democratizing an already weak institution will not have the effect of providing a new means of realizing human-rights claims. Rather, it may have no discernible effect at all. The outcome of cosmopolitan democracy will not be an international regime of human rights—though it may provide a more attractive facade for the absence of such a regime.

As Michael Walzer, a more realistic commentator on—yet still an advocate of—schemes of global governance, has written, there just are no useful prece-

dents for how such schemes will come about. As he puts it, “the kinds of governmental agencies that are needed in an age of globalization haven’t yet been developed; the level of participation in international civil society is much too low; regional federations are still in their beginning stages.” Yet the willingness of liberals to advocate such schemes continues. What, we may ask, is their ultimate import, if not to justify substitutes for such schemes? And what better substitute than a benevolent (or potentially benevolent) hegemonic state that is willing, at least occasionally, to intervene in the ostensible pursuit of human-rights goals?

FROM HEGEMONY TO EMPIRES, INFORMAL OR FORMAL.

The liberal case for empire is not a straightforward one, by any means. Rather, it proceeds by a series of steps from a commitment to human rights (or other liberal values) to advocacy of its international enforcement to justification for interventions to do this and finally to authorization for the political agents capable of so intervening and enforcing these liberal norms. It is the last step that we have still to consider. Two aspects of political agency are important here: who is to be so authorized to act to enforce liberal norms globally, and what exactly should they be authorized to do?

Let’s take the second aspect—that of the ends or goals of liberal interventions—first. Returning to Ignatieff and his advocacy of humanitarian interventions, he notes the following criteria that he asserts must apply in order to justify them: (1) the existence of human rights abuses; (2) their constituting a threat to international peace and security (in the region); (3) the possibility that military action can end the abuses; and, in addition, a de facto fourth criterion, “the region in question must be of vital interest . . . to one of the powerful nations of the world and another powerful nation does not oppose the exercise of force.” About these criteria in general Ignatieff makes the point that, without them, and without a mechanism to act on them, those who wish to intervene will go ahead and do so anyway. But this will make interventions less legitimate and, therefore, less successful. Success is obviously essential here, for if the third criterion cannot be met, intervention would not be justified. How this criterion could be met I will discuss in a moment. But the fourth de facto criterion is the crucial one: even given the intent to utilize the UN, at least as an authorizing body, for legitimate interventions, intervention
still requires the agency of a hegemonic power to go forward. This is the imperialist criterion: if it is only pursuant to the interest of powerful states that interventions can be successful, then such actions are essentially, however, liberals may otherwise view them, equivalent to imperialist actions.

Ignatieff certainly does not see them this way. For him, it is very much how the interventions end that determines their imperialistic or non-imperialistic character. Discussing NATO's Kosovo intervention, he writes that "an indefinite protectorate amounts to imperialism, and this violates the anti-imperial ethos of our human rights commitment." But this comes at the end of a passage in which he reflects that such a protectorate is probably the necessary element to making such intervention a success. Otherwise, withdrawal would amount to leaving the region in worse shape than before the intervention, with all the attendant conflicts reappearing, perhaps inflamed by the violence done by the intervention itself, plus the existence of a power vacuum and the anarchy and further violence resulting from that. As Ignatieff himself puts it, "Today...the chief threat to human rights comes not from tyranny alone, but from civil war and anarchy." And he adds, "It can be said with certainty that the liberties of citizens are better protected by their own institutions than by the well-meaning interventions of outsiders." 

Given this candid assessment, why then do Ignatieff and other liberals insist on the legitimacy of interventions? Because "something must be done" — the very idea of human rights suggests, for them, its universalization by any means necessary. The only problem is the end of the endgame — are the means employed ultimately inconsistent with the ends sought? Not if self-government is the end result, so that peoples can protect their own rights. So we enter on the murky ground of regime change and state building, to use the current jargon. Military interventions and protectorates are legitimate if they are used as means to reconstruct governments into liberal states. We have now come full circle to the nineteenth-century Millian argument for empires.

Is there any way out of this dilemma for liberal theory? Current attempts focus on the first aspect of the problem of political agency to enact global liberal norms, the question of who is to be authorized to act. Two approaches have been used to try and solve this problem — one is that of establishing a legitimate hegemony, and the other is that of using a collective form of authorization. The first has been argued for by Leo Brilmayer in her book "American Hegemony, the second most recently by Allen Buchanan in his work "Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination."

Brilmayer contends that despite the obvious asymmetries and abuses of power that hegemonic states such as the United States exercise, it is still the case that "hegemony also creates the opportunity for political morality." Great powers have their own goals; but to the extent that they are truly hegemonic, they also increasingly become susceptible to appeals from subordinate parties and peoples. Great powers can allow for benevolence in a way that contested and beleaguered powers cannot.

But beyond this psychological insight, if it is that, is Brilmayer's assertion that international relations are not best understood as relations between equal (and equally legitimate) states. They consist not of horizontal relations between (formally) equal states, but of vertical (and unequal) relations between hegemonic and subordinate entities. In this respect, international relations are similar to relations between governments and citizens within states. The important consequence of this view is that just as we can make ethical judgments about the responsibilities of a government to its citizens, so we can make similar judgments about the responsibilities of hegemonic powers toward their subordinates in the international system. Some hegemons may be legitimate and others not, in other words — as Brilmayer puts it, all political philosophies (except anarchism) include concepts of "justified hierarchy." Hegemonic states can be held to standards and expected to take actions that are ethically legitimate, just as governments can be.

While this may be true, it is also the case that providing hegemonic states with additional opportunities for mischief (as well as morality) seems to be a bad move. Rather, the actions of hegemons ought to be restricted so that the opportunities they have to act morally or otherwise will be tested as little as possible. This is, in fact, the purpose of adherence to international law, which seeks to restrict such opportunities for power to be exercised (whether for good or bad). Yet this is the conservative view that has so disturbed liberals intent on realizing their global agenda. Liberalism seems to entail the hope that the powerful can be persuaded to use their power for liberal ends — but in any case, that if they do not in one or another instance, this is no reason for restricting that power. Better to have an empire that could be used for good ends than to have no means of directly achieving these ends at all.
But if we cannot reasonably expect the emerging to act morally, yet cannot give up on a global human-rights regime, perhaps hegemonic power can be tamed through the medium of collective agency. Allen Buchanan has given the most recent argument for this widely held hope—that there ought to be criteria for intervention in cases of human rights abuse, criteria that can either be acted on by international agencies or, failing that, by states collectively authorized by such agencies. This view has also been given expression in the widely read report *The Responsibility to Protect*, written by an international commission supported by the Canadian government.48

Buchanan’s argument is that if appropriate international institutions and regulations are in place and operating, then sanctioning interventions will be procedurally legitimate and not subject to the dictates of hegemonic powers. Conversely, refusing to sanction interventions at all will actually allow greater discretion for states, especially hegemonic ones, to intervene at will.49 But there are obvious problems with such a view of collective authorization for interventions. What guarantee of impartiality do we have for international organizations that have historically been more or less willing to sanction any actions that hegemonic powers undertake? There just is no procedural guarantee that collectively authorizing interventions will be any less imperialist than the unilateral actions that have been taken. Furthermore, institutionalizing authorization for interventions risks turning organizations officially committed to pursuing peace and security into war-making entities who sanction hegemonic powers in pursuit of their own ends. As Lior Damrosch has written of the effect of such a change, “international law would ironically be transformed from a system of restraints on transboundary projections of military power into a system of affirmative approval for achieving political objectives through forcible means.”50

Historians have noted that the nineteenth-century colonial empires were not for the most part created according to a well-defined plan for imperial domination of the non-European world.51 European powers gradually, for a variety of reasons, and in a variety of ways, acquired in some ways unprecedented power over peoples and countries well removed from their traditional spheres of political influence and even from their areas of interest. That this could happen again—and may be happening today—suggests that a justification for empire need not be an explicit one. Rather, it can be put together from a number of related notions that imply the possible, conditional desirability of imperial administration and control of other countries. It is instructive to note that recent tendencies in liberal political philosophy, itself hegemonic intellectually since the end of the Cold War, may be contributing, however unintentionally, to just such an eventuality.

**IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO LIBERAL IMPERIALISM?**

Is there any way to avoid this eventuality? Of course, empires fall as well as rise. Furthermore, as I have hoped to show, the liberal justification for empires—and it is the chief one used historically and at present—is problematic due to its contradictory attempt to use humanitarian considerations as an argument for what are essentially antihumanitarian actions. The political cosmopolitanism that leads, as I have suggested, to a liberal defense of empires becomes either a failed project—due to the unrealizability of the global institutions that it advocates—or an opportunistic accommodation to the designs of hegemonic states.

So the first possible alternative to liberal imperialism lies in rejecting cosmopolitanism as a political project and reconstituting liberalism as a moral philosophy.52 We may just all be moral cosmopolitans now, in the sense that the idea of a universal claim of all human beings to equal respect is a bedrock principle for conservative, liberal, and radical thinkers alike (one exception would no doubt be avowed theocrats, who would privilege members of their own faith over others). But realizing such a bedrock principle politically is where the controversies really begin.

If liberalism is worth maintaining as a political philosophy as well, it would be as much more circumscribed one than the globalists and nascent liberal imperialists would consider acceptable. This is the interest of Rawls's late work on international ethics, work that has angered so many of his followers, as well as others not already committed to a Rawlsian contractualism. While Rawls still voices the principles of a liberal philosophy that he had characterized earlier as a political liberalism, he deliberately refuses to apply the contractual apparatus of his early theory to the global scale, or indeed to advocate global institutions that could realize the robust program of distributive justice and maximalist human rights many of his former followers espouse. While remaining a liberal constitutionalist and moral cosmopolitan, Rawls is a conser-
ative internationally, because he continues to accept a conditional principle of state sovereignty and rejects grandiose schemes for global governance and redistribution.

But this conservatism is at the same time the only philosophy consistent with a real commitment to the principle of political self-determination that underlay the anticolonial movements of the early twentieth century. It is this principle of political or popular self-determination — of a continuing advocacy of the idea of rule by the people, both internally and externally — that has been and remains the true basis of antihegemonic politics. Of course, the liberal imperialist might argue that a benign neo-imperial imposition of liberal values (i.e., human rights) is preferable to the toleration of dictatorial and illiberal regimes — Baathist Iraq being the current paradigmatic example of such a regime. In fact, as Jack Donnelly has candidly affirmed, human rights themselves serve not only as a means of arguing for the satisfaction of important human needs but also as a standard of political legitimacy that can be used against illiberal states.

But state building by foreign military occupation is a notoriously difficult, if not impossible, enterprise; and in any case, it is contradictory to the principle of self-determination that it is ostensibly designed to serve. As we saw above, liberals such as Ignatieff attempt to avoid this contradiction by arguing, as Mill did before them, for a quick invasion, a brief occupation, and so on. But, as David Chandler noted, if the existing state is so bankrupt that it merits violent overthrow, what assurance is there that it could be replaced with a more liberal one with any ease or speed, especially given the decimation of civil society that such a state may have caused? So if liberalism is to eschew the imperialist temptation, it must also give up on the project of creating liberal states by force, accepting the modest principles of solidarity with and (mutual) aid between peoples.

But what about the protection of human rights, a principle that seems to be essential to liberal philosophy? If liberalism is to be rescued, it must accept the limitations of the minimalist interpretation of human rights — the bare or basic set of rights that could be said to be most inextricably linked with the material survival of persons and peoples (for instance, rights to the preservation of life, liberty of thought, security of personal property, and the prevention of discriminatory treatment). But even here, with this basic list, it is important that the traditional humanitarian philosophy of emergency aid and relief again be recognized as the appropriate response in all but perhaps the most egregious cases of rights violation (in other words, while still leaving room for what might be called a genocide exception).

Just as with the political cosmopolitan belief that justice can be done globally if only an appropriate agent could be found (and why not a hegemonic state with the power to do this?), so it is with the human rights activists' belief that all wrongs can be righted. The approaches of solidarity with the oppressed and aid to the suffering are the true methods of the moral cosmopolitan. The Faustian bargains with hegemonic states that some hope might break the grip of dictatorial regimes and neglectful societies only lead to other forms of dictatorship (imperial rather than local) or neglect of human needs (capitalist rather than neo-feudal).

It is likely, however, that, with the lonely exception of Rawls and a few others, liberalism has gone too far down the road of globalist and maximalist temptations to retreat from its flirtation with empire. It may well be that only a new radical philosophy of needs, rather than a liberal philosophy of rights, however circumscribed, can address the tremendous problems of a world growing more oppressive and inequitable. As Chandler mentions in relation to humanitarianism, it is the substitution of an ideal, that of human rights, for a material reality, that of unmet needs, that is the real meaning of the shift away from the old humanitarian emphasis on emergency relief and to a neo-imperial politics of state building.

It is a task for the future to recreate such a radical philosophy of needs satisfaction that does not get lost in the contradictions of liberal rights theory — and to embody this philosophy in a new form of political action. After all, it may have been that the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled not only the end of a state that occasionally played a counterhegemonic role to US global dominance but also to the patent absence of any concrete form of international solidarity, socialist or otherwise. The belief of many formerly radical activists that first NGOs, then international organizations such as the UN, and finally, a hegemonic state bent on overthrowing local tyrannies could serve as a vehicle for their emancipatory hopes must surely have been a reaction to this collapse and absence. If we cannot yet discern the shape of new forms of global solidarity and activism (though there may be some indications of it in the current
global justice movements), we can at least insist on the ethically stringent position of defending the independence and integrity of peoples. However palpable certain regimes or societies may be at times, finding the means to express solidarity with and give aid to their peoples is preferable to acquiescing in the politics of war making and empire building, even when given a liberal veneer of progress and enlightenment.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 370.
12. For the constructivist view, see Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, part 1; for the naturalist view, see Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
22. Ibid., 86.
23. Ibid., 98.
26. Ibid., ch. 3.
28. See Rieff, Bed for the Night, ch. 2.
32. Ibid., 46.
36. See Rawls, Law of Peoples, 59–88, on this distinction between decent and liberal peoples.
37. Rawls uses a distinction between external (international) and internal sovereignty that may not be familiar to many. Internal sovereignty or legitimacy is a separate matter from whether states are recognized members of international society, and therefore able to claim the rights of territorial integrity and sovereignty that such members are accorded. On this distinction, see M. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially 158.
42. Ignatieff, Human Rights, 40.
43. Ibid., 43.
44. Ibid., 46.
45. Ibid., 35.
47. Ibid., 26.
51. Ferguson, Empire, 368.