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Special Issue on
Where Development Meets History

Guest Editor
ROB JENKINS

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Where Development Meets History

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That the study of contemporary development lacks historical awareness is a common lament.¹ It is a difficult charge to rebut. One reaction is to plead guilty, but to claim extenuating circumstances. Intensely preoccupied with the crises afflicting today's 'developing' societies, including their relations with the 'developed' world, policy specialists might reasonably insist that delving too deeply into the distant past is a luxury they can ill afford. Another response, more characteristic of the academic researcher, is to ask for clarification: what exactly does the plea for greater attention to history actually mean when applied to the politics of development? This is the question that I will address in introducing the collection of papers that comprise this special issue of *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*.²

The diversity of the contributions to this collection hints at the range of meanings underlying the persistent call for the study of development to be 'historicised'.³ The papers vary in terms of the questions the authors investigate, the methodologies deployed, the regions analysed, and the periods covered. Amidst this diversity, which reflects to some degree the range of disciplinary backgrounds represented among the contributors, it is possible to discern three ways in which the relationship between history and development has been formulated. For the sake of convenience, they can be labelled as (1) 'the history of development ideas', (2) 'the use of historical parallels to support development theory', and (3) 'the impact of historical pathways on future development choices'.

Most of the papers in this collection are spread across more than just one of these three broad areas of conceptual inquiry, in the process throwing up new perspectives on the interface between history and development, particularly as

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these relate to issues of politics, the common thematic denominator underlying these studies.

Development's Intellectual History: Tracing the Origins and Evolution of Contentious Ideas

The first way of relating history to the study of development is perhaps the most straightforward, and falls within the recognisable framework of intellectual history. A large body of existing literature interrogates the historical origins of development concepts and their evolution over time. Such studies serve at least two analytical purposes. First, examining the historical contexts in which ideas like 'free trade' took shape places them in an overtly political perspective: it illuminates not only the role politics was expected to play in particular conceptions of development, but also the contending political pressures that influenced their emergence in the first place. In the case of free trade, these two aspects of politics were closely related: in nineteenth century Britain, reduced barriers to international commerce were portrayed by free trade advocates as a way of undermining the influence of political lobbies over price levels – of depoliticising commercial policy – though in fact many of those promoting this idea themselves represented interests with a powerful stake in policy reform.

While a development concept's rise to pre-eminence sometimes represents the triumph of one set of interests over another – or is at least portrayed as such retrospectively – it is probably more often the case that ideas about development emerge from a process of political compromise. The article by John Toye and Richard Toye in this collection nicely illustrates this point. The Toyes engage in a historical exhumation of the modern conception of 'economic development' itself – that is, as a conscious objective of the international community since the Second World War. But rather than simply tracing the idea back to the statements of leading public figures of the period – US President Harry Truman's enunciation of the doctrine that bears his name is a common reference point for scholars chronicling the history of development thinking – the Toyes unearth the institutional politics behind the turn towards economic development. Their research is part of the United Nations Intellectual History Project,⁴ which investigates the influence of UN agencies and personnel on development ideas.

The Toyes remind us that the UN's commitment to a rather broadly framed notion of economic development was not inevitable, just as the UN's embrace of human rights was never a foregone conclusion, a point emphasised recently by the historian Mark Mazower (2004).⁵ In fact, a group of Keynesian economists, supported by some European member states, had pressed strongly for the key UN organs to dedicate themselves to promoting a kind of global Keynesianism, stressing full employment and implying strong international mechanisms

for coordinating the several aspects of macroeconomic policy. The US government, backed by a clique of market-oriented economists, vigorously opposed this idea.

The Toyes argue that a somewhat vague notion of 'economic development', in which the degree of coordination among member states' economic policies was left unspecified, emerged as a kind of compromise formula to assuage the feuding camps. It reflected UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's belief that the fledgling global body was too fragile to withstand discord on fundamental economic issues. The compromise on promoting economic development in parts of the world that were then emerging from colonial rule was driven by Hammarskjöld's desire to avoid open conflict among the UN's leading member states. It was also, no doubt, aided by an understanding on the part of these same states that using international resources to promote development could be a useful diplomatic strategy in its own right: the new members of the UN club (and those soon to achieve membership) could prove valuable allies on any number of issues facing the great powers.

In their review of the expert panel reports produced for the UN in its early years, the Toyes also demonstrate a second advantage of researching the history of development ideas, which is that 'new' ideas are often not as new as scholars fixated on the developmental present might think. The Toyes cite textual evidence which shows that the importance of governance, as a variable affecting the ability of a given policy regime to achieve its stated development objectives, was well recognised by experts writing in the mid-1950s. It was not, in other words, an invention of development practitioners in the 1990s.

That conceptions of governance and development have a history worth tracing is an idea found in two other contributions to this collection – those by Hewitt and Cornwall. Hewitt's account of 'good government', in fact, goes much further back than the 1950s, to early twentieth century British colonialism. Surveying not only key texts outlining the meaning of good government, but also practices of rulership that sought to enact this supremely adaptable idea, Hewitt provides a particularly valuable way of understanding why good government has remained a constant theme in efforts to promote development transnationally – whether through policies devised by an imperial power for its dependent territories or, in the post-imperial age, by aid donors for developing countries. Each time the notion of good government made one of its periodic reappearances during the twentieth century it was seized upon as a way of explaining the shortcomings of the previous dispensation. Where economic or social policies failed, one could always point the finger of blame at the larger governance context – that is, the institutional relationships within which policies were inevitably situated.⁶

Hewitt argues that, whether instrumentally exculpatory or not, in each revival of governance the initial proposals to revamp institutional structures

were fairly radical – emphasising the need to decentralise decision-making, or to rethink the uses to which natural resources were put, or the relations upon which the control of land were based. By signifying a belief that the existing arrangements for exercising power were ill-suited to a changing world, the notion of good government at mid-century went through a radical phase, just as it did when good government reappeared as a developmental shibboleth at the end of the cold war (the main historical parallel that Hewitt pursues). In the early 1990s, the need for developing country governments to open up their political systems and to respect basic human rights were suddenly no longer taboo subjects for western aid agencies, which had long observed diplomatic niceties that required them to refrain from commenting openly on the lack of these liberal traits (or the presence of systemic corruption) in the countries in which they operated. Hewitt draws this parallel not simply to suggest that in both cases advocates of good government were responding to crises of legitimacy – of empire in the 1940s, and of aid as a foreign policy instrument following the demise of the Soviet threat in the 1990s. Rather, Hewitt is able to demonstrate that each time good government re-emerged on the rhetorical scene it tended to pass through a series of predictable phases. Both in the 1940s and in the 1990s, the radical formulation of good government gave way to an altogether less threatening version. Stripped of its transformative potential, the idea retreated into cliché.

Cornwall's paper on participation – a key element in the discourse of good government, but also an idea that has appealed to development thinkers for whom the governance rubric was deeply alien – also returns to the colonial period, before working its way back to the present day. What is particularly interesting about the notion of participation, and indeed participatory practices in the work of development actors, is the frequency with which the idea has been rediscovered – without really ever having been lost. It is almost as if the very act of reinventing the idea of participation, by situating it within an ostensibly novel conception of development (articulated, for instance, as 'human development' or 'people-centred development'), has become a marker of novelty, a self-conscious means through which each successive generations has staked its claim to difference. Cornwall admits to being perplexed at the ability of each succeeding wave of participation advocates to convince themselves that they were onto something genuinely new. And yet participatory strategies – whether in the local formulation of development objectives, the implementation of development programmes, or the monitoring of development works – have tended to be subverted with depressing regularity by the very actors whose power they were designed to challenge. Given this tendency, it is remarkable that each time the idea of participation is resurrected, it faces little trouble in resuming its role as the missing link in development thinking and practice.

While emphasising certain continuities, Cornwall's paper also highlights differences among the various conceptions of participation. In particular, she observes that the way in which the idea was deployed during the period in which Britain (and British practitioners) dominated international development thinking was very different from the notion of participation that became more prominent once American thinking (backed by the ascendancy of American power) became predominant. One irony is that the uses to which the idea of participation was put during the colonial era may well have been more radical in their implications than those promoted during the period in which developing areas had achieved independent statehood, a time when cold war rivalries often undermined even well-meaning attempts by committed development professionals to promote participation among the truly marginalised. But Cornwall is, rightly, not willing to reduce these differences to reflections of geopolitics. The difference between the type of participatory approaches associated with these two eras, she suggests, may have more to do with the distinct visions of civil society found in American and British (or even Continental) understandings of democracy, an idea that she traces back to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, for whom the burdens of history (the second of the three approaches to analysing the development-history interface) loomed large.

The Burdens of History: Path Dependence and Constrained Development Options

Rather than uncovering the historical roots of development concepts, and seeking to determine the significance of their subsequent trajectories, a second response to the plea that development studies must be more firmly rooted in history has been to devise analytical strategies for more directly assessing the impact of the past on the present.

A growing body of recent work has engaged with historical materials in an effort to trace the roots of divergent post-colonial developmental performance. Working at a macro level, Abernethy (2000) examines variations across time and space – between French and British colonialism, for instance, and between various periods of expansion and contraction of their imperial domains – all of which contributes to an appreciation of why what came after colonialism looked as it did. Kohli (1994), on the other hand, traces the emergence of the developmental state in South Korea back to features of Japanese colonial rule – a controversial thesis if ever there was one. His argument is that, for all its brutality, Japanese colonial rule drove an outmoded state to form a series of 'production-oriented alliances with the dominant classes', which in turn fuelled the process of industrialisation.⁷ This analytical approach has informed the work of other scholars, including historians who

have felt emboldened to enter debates on contemporary development issues (notably, Ferguson, 2004).

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) go even further, citing a detailed analysis of quantitative empirical data to argue for the 'path dependence' of certain features of colonial rule. The central premise of path dependence is that early policy choices constrain the range of options available to subsequent rounds of policy choice. Such constraints need not prove insurmountable, but create a kind of bias towards certain sets of options for future decision-makers. Decisions, once taken, create paths of least resistance. There are all kinds of complications to the notion of path dependence, not least the fact that the perceived cost of breaking free from an earlier path will vary depending on the nature of the decision-making actor involved, the ideational frameworks within which they operate, and the types of information available to them. The idea of path dependence is in some ways a reincarnation (in a more rigorous social-scientific form) of an earlier historical tradition of understanding the weight, or burdens, of history, and in that sense could itself form the subject of a historical tracing exercise of the sort discussed in the first part of this essay. There is no shortage of criticism alleging that path dependence as a theory, and studies that rely for their explanatory power on variants of path dependence, represent merely the latest incarnation of analytical determinism, with all its attendant ills. Indeed, when faced with studies by economists who use history mainly as a source of data with which to advance unsubtle hypotheses concerning the causes of developmental outcomes, those who had earlier called for scholars to pay more attention to history may regret ever having voiced such a plea, and find themselves revisiting the proverb about being careful what one wishes for.

On the other hand, when deployed more sensitively, the idea of path dependence can provide a useful corrective to the notion that development is a domain of 'free will', in which policymakers face equal chances of making the right decisions, regardless of the histories to which they are heir. (In places where public opinion matters, moreover, popular *perceptions* of history can be as consequential a factor as the objective conditions wrought by past economic and political events.) That the past exerts a strong influence on future potential may seem a trite observation, but it is a radical suggestion at a time when universal policy prescriptions – deemed likely to produce similar outcomes regardless of where they are implemented – are so widespread on issues such as how to combat corruption, how to kick-start growth, and how to promote adherence to constitutional norms. If the chronic economic crises of the past quarter-century tell us anything – and here I self-consciously deploy an analytical strategy discussed critically in the next section of this essay – it is that not only are the implications of similar policies unlikely to prove equally similar when undertaken under

vastly different conditions – free trade again provides a useful illustration – the very willingness to attempt such policies varies according to a range of factors that have their roots far enough back in time to qualify, by any reckoning, as historical.

The article by Subrahmanyam in this collection engages most directly with the idea of path dependence. Subrahmanyam asks why it is that some former British colonies, most notably India, were able to construct viable democratic political systems, while others were not. Clearly there is variation even within the non-democracies in Africa that constitute the bulk of Subrahmanyam's cases – democracy being a continuous rather than discrete variable – but, even so, a strong case is made for seeking, in the colonial histories of these countries, the roots of their subsequent political trajectories. Subrahmanyam closely analyses budget data from a range of cases to assess variation in the types of expenditure found in each colonial territory. It is reasonable to expect that certain kinds of expenditure (particularly those directed towards social development, rather than towards extracting surpluses for the imperial 'centre') might correlate with a greater propensity towards democracy in the post-colonial era. But no such correlation is found.

A far more consequential historical legacy, Subrahmanyam argues, was the nature of British experimentation with granting 'proto-statehood' to their colonial territories. In some cases, most notably India, various phases of quasi-'responsible' government – often involving progressively larger democratic elements – were a feature of the process through which decolonisation took place. In short, the longer a territory's period of democratic experimentation *while still formally under colonial rule*, the better the chances of sustaining democratic institutions (and the rule of law more generally) after independent statehood was formally granted. Subrahmanyam has not formulated this as a law-like statement, preferring to use her case material to lend credence to an argument that could constitute a hypothesis for future research, which could in turn test it with the aid of a much larger set of cases. But her basic finding – which emphasises the duration of democratic experimentation – powerfully recasts the relationship between colonial history and post-colonial political forms.

In addition to demonstrating the weight of history in shaping the options facing developing countries, Subrahmanyam's paper – which involves a much more complex set of variables (such as the nature of ethnic fractionalisation) than can be treated in this brief overview – also underscores the importance of unpacking familiar historical periodisations. Students of development have grown accustomed to thinking of decolonisation as a moment of sharp historical rupture – and of course in many respects it was. But even if the granting of independent statehood represented an identifiable point of legal transformation, which was more or less equivalent across countries, it was in

some cases the culmination of a gradual, if often unpredictable, process, while in others, the moment of independence arrived without much by way of substantial political preparation. In other words, the route through which decolonisation passed – the 'path' along which it travelled – varied widely across cases, and this variation is therefore something that can help to explain why the destinations at which these societies arrived differed so widely.

The paper by Uma Kothari similarly up-ends the conventional view of the end of empire as a clear and unambiguous watershed. Kothari uses the life histories of colonial-officials-turned-development-professionals – people whose personal narratives span the divide between the colonial and the post-colonial periods – as a lens through which to examine the unstable nature of the idea of development itself. As an enquiry into the origins and evolution of development concepts, Kothari's analysis perhaps speaks more to the first than to the second approach to historicising development: she is clearly concerned more with intellectual history (as embodied in these liminal actors) than with the role of path dependence in explaining outcomes. And yet one can discern within her analysis a sense in which the work undertaken by these actors in the post-colonial period was crucially influenced by their own personal histories in the colonial era. It is perhaps no surprise, for instance, that among the most vocal advocates of participatory development, vesting decision-making power in citizens rather than in post-colonial states whose officials all too often act in the manner of colonial bureaucrats, is a development professional who once worked in Britain's colonial civil service. This is not to say that former officials are constrained by their personal histories to frame their policy advice in as anti-colonial a discourse as possible; rather, there is a sense in which their first-hand experience of what were in essence authoritarian states, lacking mechanisms of democratic legitimation, instilled in at least some of these former colonial officials a strong belief that participatory government, involving people directly in the process of defining their own visions of development, was a necessary (though not sufficient) element in the transition from colonialism to genuine, as opposed to spurious, independence.

Kothari's analysis of these former officials, who after leaving the colonial service went on to work in aid agencies, international organisations, development studies institutes, and private consulting firms, is very revealing about both the continuities and discontinuities between the colonial and post-colonial eras. For instance, several of these former officials informed Kothari that they had considered themselves to be 'doing development' even prior to the granting of independence. The neat equation between the end of empire and the rise of development is thus called into question by Kothari's work as much as it is by the papers of Cornwall, Hewitt, and Subrahmanyam.

Kothari, moreover, causes us to rethink what we mean by history in the field of development. A number of the former colonial officials she interviewed complained that the technocrats employed by development agencies after decolonisation were in fact much less steeped in the history of the countries (and indeed localities) where they deployed their expertise than were these former servants of the colonial state, who by training and inclination were amateur historians of a sort. The colonial officials were aided by long periods spent in the field, and motivated by their awesome responsibilities as not only bureaucrats but in many cases keepers of law and order within their districts. This required an understanding of the relations between ethnic groups, the evolution of various forms of land tenure, and other subjects that only historical inquiry (based largely on primary local sources) could illuminate. Whether such actors invoke history to justify their own positions is of course another matter entirely – part of a larger issue to which we now turn.

'Lessons from History': The Use (and Abuse) of Historical Parallels in Development

The third point at which history and development intersect is in the use of historical parallels to make the case for specific development policies, or even to support fully elaborated theories of development. Encapsulating this third approach to the history–development interface is the claim, made by political scientist Robert Bates, that history and development are, for better or worse, so closely intertwined that pleas for development studies to be invested with a historical dimension are redundant.

The field of development lacks a core body of deductive theory. . . . To account for development, scholars often draw lessons from history: they extrapolate from what is 'known' to have happened in the past. As a consequence, the field belongs as much to historians as it does to social scientists (Bates, 1998: 499).

Another way of putting it is to say that *all* people studying processes of development, or events taking place in developing societies, need to *become* historians of a sort. Given Bates' observation about the tendency for scholars to rely on what are often spurious – or at least highly contestable – 'lessons from history', there is an urgent need to address the question: How have particular readings of history been used to inform ideas about the relationship between politics and development?

A large range of both academic and quasi-popular studies (dating at least back to the 1960s) has sought to account for the emergence of prosperity in Europe and North America – the world's early developers.⁸ These and

other studies often centre on the relationship between political and economic power (examined both 'domestically' and in terms of relations between states), and the conditions under which a balance is struck between the need for state power to enforce property rights and the necessity of restraining those who would abuse this power. Such lessons from history are then used to justify particular policy prescriptions – land consolidation (or redistribution), liberalised (or more restrictive) trade regimes – or even to support more grandiose claims about the nature of the development process generally: whether it is driven by class alignments, rates of capital formation, the constitution of the international order, and so forth.

Among the more recent development controversies involving disputes over the implications of the historical record is the debate over whether World Trade Organization (WTO) rules should be amended to allow states to use trade sanctions to punish governments that do not enforce international labour standards. Opponents of such an approach argue that it misreads the 'lessons' of early developers in Europe and North America: seeking to impose global labour regulations would, according to critics, disrupt the natural historical progression, whereby industrial growth catalyses domestic working class movements, which in turn press (successfully) for higher wages and better working conditions (Singh & Zammit, 2001). Whether this view misrepresents history, or simply misreads its relevance for today's globalising world, is an open question. What these sorts of debates undoubtedly illustrate, however, is that the past is very much a presence in debates about development, whether this is explicitly acknowledged or not.

Christopher Clapham's contribution to this collection provides an account of the successive developmental models pursued by the Ethiopian state throughout the twentieth century. It vividly illustrates the tendency for advocates of one or another development strategy to draw on historical parallels to justify its adoption. Clapham shows how Japan's rapid modernisation during the Meiji period appealed to Ethiopia's rulers during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the extent to which those who considered Ethiopia well positioned to replicate Japan's process of economic modernisation were willing to stretch the parallels between these two countries in order to justify the adoption of various policy measures – indeed to cast them as almost scientifically derived lessons from history. The notion that it was possible to build a modern economy while still retaining a monarchical form of government had its obvious attractions to the Ethiopian emperor and his advisors, even if the analogy between landlocked Ethiopia and maritime Japan may seem far-fetched to other, more objective, observers. That the World Bank during the 1990s sought actively to use the case of the East Asian economic miracle to convince African countries of the need to emulate the policies of South Korea, Taiwan, and other 'high-performing Asian economies' that

had themselves adopted a Japanese-style approach to policymaking should remind us that the tendency to stretch a historical parallel can afflict even institutions that claim to operate on the basis of rigorous empirical analysis.

The Ethiopians later turned to the Soviet model for inspiration, taking what they wanted from the history of the USSR to support their policy choices, just as Jawaharlal Nehru borrowed what he considered the essence of Soviet planning to justify the applicability of a mixed-economy model to Indian conditions. Clapham notes the diligence with which Ethiopian intellectuals and administrators interrogated the meaning of Marxist theoretical texts as a way of arriving at what to them appeared the correct interpretation of the underlying doctrine. This may well have constituted a self-conscious method of avoiding a repetition of the earlier experience of emulating a model of dubious relevance (Meiji Japan), and would thus in a sense constitute a kind of lesson from their own developmental history, however recent. At the same time, the questions that preoccupied Marx, such as the stages through which societies were expected to pass *en route* to communism – which reflected his belief in universal laws of history – appear not to have unduly troubled those who pressed forward a uniquely Ethiopian brand of Marxist-Leninist developmental ideology. Or, at the very least, these theorists proved highly adept at convincing themselves that certain conditions had been met, which to less biased eyes might appear to have been strikingly absent.

Whether Ethiopia's turn towards a liberal European-style development strategy – another off-the-shelf historical model to which officials of course had ready access – was any more suitable to Ethiopia's circumstances is similarly questionable. But again, Ethiopians' view of their own history, particularly the country's status as an early outpost of Christianity and one of the few parts of the non-western world that did not end up as a European colony (despite Mussolini's brief foray in their direction), would certainly have played a large part in persuading development strategists that there were enough similarities with the west to justify an attempt to emulate what were considered the essential ingredients of its economic success.

No less suggestible, in their own way, were the legal theorists and economists whose approaches to promoting economic growth and reducing poverty through reform of land-ownership systems form the subject of Ambreena Manji's contribution to this collection. Manji pays particular attention to the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, whose research and advocacy efforts have focused on the entrepreneurial dynamism (and the constraints thereon) of people who by most measures are poor. However, their poverty, according to de Soto, stems from the fact that they operate in the informal economy, a parallel universe outside official regulatory frameworks, which (for a variety of reasons) denies them access to the legal instruments necessary

to transform their possessions (and skills, but mainly possessions) into 'capital' – against which they could borrow and in which they could further invest, to the betterment both of their own well-being and the prospects of the economies of which they are an essential part. This transformation of land – something which even many poor people 'own', but to which they lack formal legal title – into a capital asset is, for de Soto, part of a historical process that (as with so much in the developing world) has not conformed to what transpired in medieval and early-modern Europe. Without acknowledging as much, de Soto's analysis 'normalises' the European case, in effect consigning to outlier status the local histories of the many regions of the world to which his policy prescriptions (land titling, the creation of transparent secondary markets) have been directed.

Manji explores this problematic by examining both what is said and what is left unsaid in the writings of de Soto and other development thinkers, and indeed in World Bank policy documents. She argues that not only are certain approaches to the unfolding of historical sequences implicit in the policy recommendations found in the practitioner literature on development – even as a blind eye is turned to the history of dominance and subordination concealed within these larger narratives – but, perhaps as importantly, insufficient attention is paid to the very complex nature of the ostensible historical models from which lessons have supposedly been derived. Were the history of European and other earlier developers examined more closely, Manji suggests, it might be possible to recognise the important role played by 'legal pluralism', the coexistence of formal state 'law' with other practices that in themselves constitute a kind of socially produced normative order that shares many of the attributes of law. Moreover, a more careful assessment of how land is used, shared, and passed on by people for whom state law is but a small part of everyday existence might reveal to de Soto and other proponents of 'legal centralism' some of the hidden advantages of less formal modes of property relations. Rather than advocating an escape from the burdens of history, Manji's research suggests the necessity of disaggregating history, inspecting its fragments in ways relevant to the contexts in which people operate and the concepts through which they derive meaning.

While the papers in this special issue of *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* are illustrative of the range of approaches through which the intersection between development and history has been tackled, they are not presented as an exhaustive microcosm of what is a very large universe of analytic possibilities. By collecting this diverse array of texts together in one volume, however, it is hoped that they may assist other scholars in identifying as yet

unexplored dimensions of what is, for all the intellectual innovations of the past 20 years, a very marginal subfield, though one that seems ripe for exploitation – not least because of trends in the field of historical studies itself, where international and global history is very much in the ascendant (Connelly, 2002: xi–xii).

Notes

1. It was partly to rectify the imbalance of 'presentism' that the History and Economic Development Study Group was formed within the UK Development Studies Association. See <http://www.devstud.org.uk/studygroups/history.htm>.
2. Most of the papers were originally presented in a seminar series held during 2003–04. I am grateful to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, and to its director, Tim Shaw, for providing us a venue and administrative support, and to the participants in the seminar for their perceptive comments on the draft papers.
3. The possibility of reorienting university curricula to address this lacuna was the subject of one of the presentations in the seminar series from which this collection emerged (note 2) – Jane Parpart's 'Historicizing development theory: new approaches to teaching development', held on 29 April 2004, London.
4. <http://www.unihp.org>.
5. According to Mazower, the specific nature of the UN's commitment to human rights resulted from a similar political compromise. The UN Charter's emphasis on individual rights, which had no legally binding force at the time it was framed, provided a fig leaf for the allies abandoning their commitment to protecting group rights – of national minorities in east and central Europe – which had been a core feature (at least in theory) of the League of Nations.
6. I have developed this point with respect to the emergence of the governance discourse of the 1990s in Jenkins (2001).
7. A revised version of this thesis, complemented by in-depth analysis of case material from Brazil, India and Nigeria, is found in Kohli (2004).
8. A highly selective sampling, designed to indicate both the diversity of approaches adopted and the longevity of this particular analytical phenomenon, might include Gershenkron (1962), Moore (1966), Kennedy (1988), O'Rourke & Williamson (1999), Olson (2000), and Bates (2001).

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