Postwar immigration has caused ethnic minorities to become established in most West European countries, and political backlashes against them have increased in the past few decades. Why does national-level mobilization against immigration develop and sometimes result in more restrictive immigration policies? Theories of immigration control policies have answered these questions largely in terms of economic grievances and national political institutions. By contrast, this article offers a theoretical account of how antiimmigration mobilization grows and influences national policy through the leadership of subnational politicians and social movement organizations. It further argues that their actions are substantially autonomous from socioeconomic factors.\(^1\) The method used here is a comparison following a most different systems design, in which four cases of immigration restrictions under very different background conditions, in Britain and Germany, are analyzed in order to identify necessary conditions.\(^2\)

Immigration here refers to the entry into a country of people who are seen as belonging to ethnic groups distinct from the native population and who remain in the receiving country for many years. Antiimmigration mobilization consists of public statements and actions intended to gain political support for policies that will restrict immigration. Policies are restrictive if they intend and achieve reductions in immigration rates relative to previous policies.

**Economic Grievances and National Political Factors**

Economic grievance explanations of immigration control posit that immigration and unemployment cause antiimmigration mobilization based on political actors’ material interests. Borrowing from ethnic competition theory, one strand of this work holds that immigration and economic downturns increase competition for jobs, housing, and social welfare spending, leading voters who belong to the ethnic majority group to demand restrictions on immigration.\(^3\) A second strand posits that business associations are strongly proimmigration during periods of economic expansion and become ambivalent or uninterested during recessions, while labor unions are divided
during economic expansions and become more strongly antiimmigration during contrac-
tions. While socioeconomic conditions have important effects on antiimmigra-
tion politics, they do not comprise an adequate theory. The mechanisms through
which these factors act are unclear, and there is much they can not explain about
cross-country differences in restrictiveness and the timing of policy changes.

As a supplement to economic grievance explanations, many writers have ana-
lyzed the role of national-level political factors in immigration restrictions. They
hold that factors centered on electoral politics create and encourage antiimmigration
mobilization and the adoption of restrictive policies. Since the international system
in the postwar period has generally supported liberal immigration policies, analysts
have appropriately looked to domestic factors in order to locate the impetus for
immigration restrictions. Some argue that the availability of referenda, federalism,
and single member districts in national elections ease access to the political agenda
for those pressing for restrictions. Others argue that fragmented party systems allow
smaller parties, which are less divided on immigration issues than the mass parties
of the center-left and center-right, to give voice to antiimmigration interests in par-
liaments and in governing coalitions. Still others argue that national political cul-
tures (for example, of settler societies versus ethnonationalist western Europe) or ius
soli versus ius sanguinis legal traditions decisively shape contemporary govern-
ments’ responses to immigration, especially their citizenship policies. While these
national political factors may be useful in particular cases and in Anglo-American
versus West European comparisons, they are unsatisfactory in several ways. There
are now so many of them that as a class of explanations they are nearly unfalsifiable;
important cases of relatively successful antiimmigration politics, such as Britain and
France, run counter to most of them; and they can not explain the timing of antiim-
migration mobilization and restrictive policies.

In these regards, national political processes are more promising as factors to
place at the center of explanations of immigration restrictions. These factors include
increased voter volatility, the decline of mass parties’ electoral strength, the narrow-
ness of the national governing coalition’s parliamentary majority, and successes by
far right parties in national elections. However, the British adoption of immigration
controls in 1962, when the Conservatives enjoyed a one hundred seat majority and
the party system was stable, contradicts these explanations.

Party competition is more likely to help account for such difficult cases. Dietrich
Thranhardt argues that conservative parties in Britain, France, and Germany have
repeatedly used race-related issues in efforts to draw voters from the center-left par-
ties, despite very different levels and rates of immigration. This argument implies
the need to analyze other factors, besides changes in immigration and unemploy-
ment, that could influence national politicians toward antiimmigration positions.

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Subnational Politicians and Social Movements

The argument in this article builds on work that explains immigration politics in terms of the actions of subnational politicians and social movements, including violence against immigrants. So far, these factors have not been theoretically elaborated and related to the socioeconomic and national political approaches. I do so here in five hypotheses that draw on key insights of studies of immigration politics and political process theories of social movements.

Hypothesis 1: The Partial Autonomy of Antiimmigration Politics

First, socioeconomic conditions underlying ethnic competition are not closely related to political mobilization that achieves immigration restrictions, although there is some relationship. Socioeconomic conditions create the potential for mobilization strong enough to achieve immigration restrictions, but such mobilization does not automatically develop. Its timing, location, intensity, and protagonists are shaped more by political than by socioeconomic processes. The translation of economic grievances into political action is hindered by key features of immigration politics: national politicians from the parties of government tend to maintain a consensus on liberal policies; the geographic concentration of immigrants limits the number of native citizens who feel threatened by immigration; and actors trying to raise issues that elites exclude from the political agenda have collective action problems.

Hypothesis 2: Subnational Mobilization

Second, antiimmigration mobilization by state or local politicians precedes and influences national campaigns for and the adoption of immigration restrictions. Antiimmigration positions have a potential electoral payoff but are unlikely to receive a serious national hearing unless actors outside the circle of national political elites make them appear to be pressing public problems and therefore electorally important issues. Majorities or large minorities of the population in most West European countries have antiimmigrant attitudes; for example, 40–65 percent of citizens in eight out of twelve countries recently agreed that “there are too many foreigners” in their country. But the issue of immigration control is seldom a high priority for voters, and the issue’s salience depends largely on whether politicians draw public attention to it. National politicians are unlikely to do so because they usually participate in a consensus in which they tacitly agree to uphold liberal immigration policies and not to appeal to the antiimmigrant sentiments of the public. National politicians are reluctant to break the taboo against apparently racist or xenophobic positions for many reasons. Business prefers liberal immigration policies, and antiimmigration statements might benefit the far right, stir up racism and racist violence, anger foreign governments, and tarnish the country’s international reputation for liberalism. A politician or party which is seen as breaking the taboo might be excluded from coalition government or party leadership.
Subnational politicians are more likely to introduce anti-immigration positions to the agenda, partly because they are less bound by the terms of the liberal consensus. They are more distant from responsibility for the national state’s image abroad; they communicate less with national political elites and more with local leaders and ordinary citizens; and they may see anti-immigration politics as a potential means of gaining national attention and enhancing their careers, even if it is also a potentially disreputable and risky path. Furthermore, many immigrant groups are concentrated in urban and industrial areas, as are the native working class populations who might compete with immigrants for jobs and housing and who are disproportionately prone to vote for anti-immigration parties. This geographic concentration implies that anti-immigration mobilization may occur in certain localities although the country as a whole is not strongly affected.

Hypothesis 3: Social Movement Activity Third, subnational politicians often act under pressure from anti-immigration social movements at the local or state level. By social movements I mean sustained efforts by challengers, those who lack routine access to authoritative decision makers, to mobilize a constituency to achieve a public goal. Their efforts usually include activities, such as petitions, demonstrations, and violence, that disrupt the normal routines of electoral and interest group politics. Social movements are challengers that possess a degree of organization; they can be formal organizations or loosely organized groups. In anti-immigration politics relevant social movement groups and activities include public meetings and petitions by anti-immigration residents’ groups, violence against immigrants by native youth groups, and local election campaigns by far right parties. In both Britain and Germany far right parties are clearly outsiders to the political game, unable to participate in coalitions, hence social movement organizations. For the reasons given under the second hypothesis, anti-immigration social movements are more likely to emerge and target politicians at the local or state than at the national level.

This argument contrasts sharply with that of Jeannette Money. She holds that the actions of local politicians reflect the demands of voters, which in turn reflect local immigration, unemployment, and other economic conditions. I argue that these kinds of economic factors do not determine the timing and location of anti-immigration mobilization at the state or local level. Rather, the responses of subnational politicians are strongly influenced by actual or potential social movement activities, which in turn depend on political processes (see Hypothesis 5 below) that can not be reduced to socioeconomic factors.

Hypothesis 4: Dramatic Events Fourth, national politicians are extremely responsive to local or state-level events which major news media report to be dramatic expressions of citizens’ opposition to immigrants. Such dramatic events include mass violence against immigrants and electoral victories by candidates or parties
that use antiimmigration appeals in unusually overt, emotional, or racist ways. Social movement organizations can be important in initiating such dramatic events because they are not bound by the liberal consensus on immigration. Furthermore, social movements can attract publicity to the antiimmigration cause while allowing politicians to play the role of the moderate seeking compromise rather than of the racist trying to fan the flames of discontent.

Dramatic antiimmigrant events can influence national politicians to abandon the liberal consensus by convincing them that antiimmigrant sentiment is strong enough to pose an electoral threat or offer a payoff. The gap between elites’ liberal consensus and the public’s antiimmigrant attitudes makes national politicians deeply ambivalent about immigration. Above all, politicians have poor information about the extent to which the native population perceives ethnic competition and immigration to be serious problems. Reliable information about constituents’ preferences is especially difficult to get in this policy area because voters as well as their leaders often regard openly expressed antiimmigrant sentiment as racist or xenophobic and therefore taboo. Yet, when leading news media pay attention to antiimmigrant events, many national politicians will likely revise their estimates of the intensity of constituents’ preferences and thus make possible new alignments and shifts in policy.

**Hypothesis 5: The Politics of Social Movement Mobilization**

Fifth, social movement activities against immigrants depend on both favorable subnational political opportunity structures and available social movement organizations. Favorable political opportunity structures are those which, according to Tilly, create a relatively high probability that a group’s interests will be advanced (“opportunity”) and relatively low costs or risks of taking collective action (“facilitation” rather than “repression”). For local antiimmigrant movements, two key elements of a favorable political opportunity structure are the availability of potential allies among local or state politicians, who may take antiimmigrant or antiimmigration positions publicly, and passivity by police when antiimmigrant violence is initiated. Social movement organizations are important for mobilization because they help to solve the free-rider problem of collective action; even small, informally organized groups can do so by socially rewarding and sanctioning their members. But the availability of antiimmigration residents’ associations, far right parties, and racist youth groups depends on local factors, such as the prior history of mobilization and the present condition of local leadership.

**Case Selection**

A test of these hypotheses requires the study of a small number of cases in some depth. I selected cases on the dependent variable and sought to maximize the differ-
ences between the cases on a large number of contextual variables, an appropriate approach when testing for hypothetically necessary conditions. Therefore, I chose two countries as contexts in which to identify more temporally bound cases of anti-immigration mobilization leading to restrictive policies: Britain (Caribbean and South Asian immigration, 1958–1965) and Germany (immigration by political asylum seekers from Africa, Asia, Turkey, and eastern Europe, 1980–1993). Asylum seekers typically were able to remain in Germany for five to ten years while their cases were decided and often could remain on humanitarian grounds even if their applications were denied; hence they are immigrants in the sense of this article.

These cases meet the two main criteria of the research design. First, they include some of the most important instances of restrictive policies in western Europe during the postwar period, which resulted from some of the largest and most public anti-immigration mobilizations by national politicians. Both countries initially had unusually liberal immigration policies based on strong ideological commitments that were reversed after major episodes of antiimmigration politics. In Britain the traditional right of all Commonwealth citizens to enter Britain freely, reaffirmed in the 1948 Nationality Act, was restricted for the first time by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 and tightened further in 1965. In Germany the extraordinarily generous rights for seekers of political asylum, anchored in the constitutional Basic Law, were limited by visa requirements and a ban on employment in 1980 and more sharply by a constitutional amendment in 1993. In both countries restrictions were made easier by shifts in international relations: in Britain by the declining importance of the Commonwealth in strategic thinking and in Germany by the end of the Cold War and hence of the anticommunist rationale for a liberal asylum policy. But these international changes were only permissive and do not explain why massive domestic antiimmigration mobilization occurred and changed national policy in these countries, often against opposition by foreign allies and their advocates in the state.

Second, the antiimmigration mobilizations and policies of these two countries occurred in such different contexts that any political processes they have in common are likely to be present in other cases of immigration restriction in postwar western Europe. Socioeconomic conditions differ in the level of immigration (lower in Britain), types of immigrants (laborers with jobs in Britain versus asylum seekers receiving social assistance in Germany), extent of immigrants’ civil rights (much higher in Britain), previous experience with non-European immigrants (greater in Germany), and level of unemployment (also greater in Germany). The two countries differ politically in state structure (centralized and unitary in Britain versus decentralized and federal in Germany), electoral system and government formation (majoritarian in Britain versus proportional representation with coalition governments in Germany), and party system (stable, two party in Britain in the 1960s versus multi-party system with declining large parties in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s).
Finally, there is an important difference between the immigration politics of the two countries. Britain adopted comparatively tight restrictions on black immigration in the 1960s, when black immigrants made up less than 0.5 percent of the population and unemployment rates were below 3 percent. By contrast, Germany has retained comparatively liberal policies toward foreign workers and sharply restricted the right to political asylum only in the 1990s. Germany amended its constitution more than a decade after asylum applications reached high levels, non-Europeans reached 5 percent of the population, and structural unemployment greater than 6 percent became a feature of the economy. Subnational mobilization and social movements can help explain why Britain acted so early and Germany acted so late.

Restricting Black Immigration in Britain, 1958–1965

Controls in Britain in the 1960s targeted the “blacks” who had been immigrating from the Caribbean, India, and Pakistan since the mid 1950s. The 1962 act required citizens of Commonwealth states to obtain work vouchers from the Home Office before entering Britain; black immigration immediately declined. The Labour Party’s vocal opposition to the 1962 act, which secured exemptions for workers’ dependents and students, contrasted sharply with its later behavior in government. Instead of replacing the Immigrants Act through voluntary agreements with former colonies, as promised in its 1964 election platform and campaign, Harold Wilson’s government accepted the act and moved in August 1965 to sharply reduce the number of work vouchers.


This act was passed as the result of a cluster of dramatic events and a Conservative Party decision. In 1958 antiblack riots in two cities put the issue of immigration control on the political agenda for the first time since World War II. Three years later the Conservative government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan introduced immigration control legislation; it passed the next year with the support of the Conservatives’ large parliamentary majority. Hence the riots, the Conservative government’s decision, and the passage of the legislation in 1962 rather than 1958 need to be explained.

Confirming the dramatic event hypothesis, the 1958 riots initiated a public debate on controls which broke with a decade of inattention to the issue by government and opposition leaders. In late August and early September large crowds of white people in Nottingham and the Notting Hill section of London massed against black residents, mostly West Indians. Over one thousand people gathered and threatened blacks for two nights in Nottingham, while hundreds of people in London attacked blacks for three consecutive nights in the streets and in their homes. Although lead-
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ing national politicians denounced the violence after the fact, especially Conservatives claimed that immigration was responsible for the riots, and the issue of immigration control was debated in national politics for several months. Alec Douglas-Home, minister of state for commonwealth relations and later prime minister, called for limits on West Indian immigration, and the annual Conservative party conference passed a resolution in favor of immigration control. However, since grass-roots mobilization in 1958 was limited to the two riots, only a few MPs became intensely concerned with immigration control. In the end, the home secretary opposed controls, and there was no change in policy. Yet the riots directed the attention of national party leaders to opinion polls which showed that 80 percent of the public supported immigration controls.

The riots in Nottingham and London would not have occurred without the actions of social movement groups and facilitation by police. By early summer 1958 groups of Teddy Boys, young working-class males distinguished by long coats and bootlace ties, were active in both neighborhoods. Moreover, Notting Hill and its surroundings also had far right organizations and activity, including the headquarters of the White Defence League and many members of the Union Movement led by the fascist Oswald Mosley. Mosley’s supporters held meetings on street corners in Notting Hill earlier in the year, and during the riots their speeches and leaflets urged whites to take action against blacks. In both localities Teds and others first attacked blacks earlier in the summer, and the police did not step in. The lack of state repression emboldened potential white attackers; when sexual jealousies led to small fights, petty disputes became pretexts to mobilize large crowds to menace and attack blacks. The police remained reserved or gave in to the mob’s wishes in London; in Nottingham, by contrast, police intervened strongly on the first night of rioting and prevented large-scale attacks.

The political autonomy hypothesis is also supported by this case. Although the riots began in poor neighborhoods and their timing may have been affected by the 1958 recession, the downturn was mild, and national unemployment rose only to 2.2 percent. Black immigration was even less closely linked to rioting. Only five out of sixteen cities with substantial West Indian populations by 1962 experienced major antiblack riots from 1948 to 1965, and none had riots as severe as Notting Hill’s. Nor were the riots triggered by large concentrations or rapid influxes of blacks. Less than 1 percent of Nottingham’s population was black in 1958, and the London riots began in a neighborhood with only a small number of black residents. Moreover, the riots occurred during a decline in the national immigration rate, and the number of West Indians in Nottingham was stagnant in 1958.

Changes in socioeconomic conditions had little independent influence on the immigration control debate and legislation. Policymakers responded in part to a sharp increase in immigration in 1960–1961, but it was largely a product of the debate on immigration control begun in 1958. West Indians and especially South
Asians rushed to enter Britain before the door was closed. The rhythms of the immigration debate followed the business cycle to some extent, peaking during the recession years 1958 and 1961 as well as in the boom years 1964–1965. But the political business cycle and liberal consensus contributed to this correlation more than did ethnic competition. Since the major parties tried to keep the issue out of party competition in elections before 1964, they backed off from calls for immigration control before the 1959 general election. At the same time, the government used macroeconomic instruments to ensure an economic boom and improve its chances at the polls.

Inside the Conservative Party dissatisfaction with black immigrants was translated into national antiimmigration politics through local Conservative party organizations and locally active social movement organizations. The turning point was the October 1961 Conservative Party conference; thirty-nine antiimmigration resolutions were presented by local party groups, compared with fewer than ten at preceding conferences. The resolutions signaled local dissatisfaction possibly large enough to have consequences at the next general election. The home secretary, Butler, voiced agreement with the local organizations’ complaints, and three weeks later the government announced it would seek immigration controls. The lobbying work of the Birmingham Immigration Control Association (BICA), an upstart group based in local residents’ associations, had helped to prepare the Conservative Party for this decision. BICA collected 55,000 signatures on antiimmigration petitions and mobilized massive postcard campaigns against local Conservative organizations in 1961.

The Politics of Smethwick and Labour’s About-Face, 1964–1965 The radical shift in Labour’s position on immigration began in 1963, as party leaders tried to create a bipartisan consensus on immigration issues before the next election. However, it was accelerated and ensured by the interpretation of one dramatic event: the 1964 election in Smethwick (Birmingham). There, the Conservative upstart Peter Griffiths ran a strongly antiimmigration campaign and defeated Patrick Gordon Walker, who had been an important proimmigration spokesperson for Labour. The result of this election, as well as Walker’s defeat in an ensuing by-election at Leyton (London), was devastating for the proimmigration position. In a confirmation of the dramatic event hypothesis, the Smethwick result was interpreted as a signal of broadly based demands for immigration control.

Yet Walker’s defeat in Smethwick was largely the result of exceptional antiimmigration activity by local social movement organizations and Conservative politicians. Indeed, Smethwick conforms to a pattern present in six constituencies where antiimmigration candidates did well in the 1964 election. First, previous activity by social movement organizations was necessary for successful antiimmigration campaigns. In at least five of the six constituencies, the 1964 election campaign was preceded by several years of antiimmigration activity by BICA, far right parties, or other organi-
zations. In Smethwick itself a branch of BICA was formed in 1961, and it worked to raise awareness of immigration through letters to the editor, newspaper reporting, and a series of well-attended public meetings. In response to BICA’s efforts, the local Conservative leader Peter Griffiths began for the first time to use the antiimmigration rhetoric that helped him win in 1964. Moreover, Smethwick’s local elites provided a favorable opportunity structure for BICA’s challenge, as a Conservative city councilor and a local newspaper owned by a Conservative activist provided the group with early support.  

Second, these social movement organizations spurred candidates to use aggressive local antiimmigration election campaigns. Antiimmigration Conservatives did well in the three Birmingham constituencies where they used the immigration issue aggressively; similarly, minor parties did well with strongly antiimmigration campaigns in three London areas. The variation in local politicians’ electoral campaign strategies and their success rates is striking, and immigration levels do not account for the differences. These six constituencies had on average the same number of black immigrants as six other constituencies where immigration was considered a potential issue but was in fact muted or absent in the 1964 campaign.

Jeannette Money argues that British politicians were responding to voters in constituencies with large immigrant populations and that the number of high immigration districts (about fifty to one hundred) was large enough potentially to cost the Conservatives their majority; hence local pressures prompted a rational shift in policy by the national party. But national politicians acted with great autonomy from voters’ demands on immigration in this period. At least through the 1964 general election politicians were mostly ahead of, not following, the electorate. Moreover, although politicians increasingly expected a groundswell of antiimmigration demands by voters as a result of the increase in immigration, antiimmigrant campaigns had electoral payoffs in only a handful of places by 1964.

The lack of a groundswell is shown by the failure of the Conservatives to benefit electorally from the issue. Voters perceived that the Conservatives had taken a harder line than Labour in the debate on the 1962 act and in the 1964 election campaign, but most voters were not interested in the immigration issue. For example, in 1964 two major opinion surveys and a postcard survey conducted by the BBC Election Forum failed to turn up immigration as an issue about which voters were concerned. This lack of interest may help explain why Conservative candidates lost badly in three by-elections fought on antiimmigration positions from 1961 to 1963. Moreover, in one study of twenty-four high immigration constituencies and another study of seventeen constituencies where the immigration issue was important in the 1964 general election, the Conservative Party did no better than its national average, a 3.2 percent loss to the Labour Party. Finally, three of the four most prominent opponents of immigration did badly in the 1964 election. In this light, the Labour Party leadership seems to have overinterpreted the Smethwick result.
Germany has experienced long-term immigration by many groups in the postwar period: German refugees and displaced persons, guest workers from southern Europe and Turkey, ethnic German resettlers from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and asylum seekers from numerous countries. Although some restrictions have been imposed on all immigrating groups since the 1970s, the asylum seekers have been the targets of the greatest political mobilization. Germany’s unusually liberal asylum laws came to provide an important mechanism for immigration after the end of guest worker recruitment in 1973; Article 16 of the constitution offered an unconditional right to asylum for politically persecuted persons, which the courts interpreted to include extensive rights to judicial review. It was therefore very difficult for the government to deport a foreigner who had applied for asylum, and Germany attracted over half of all asylum seekers who came to European Community countries beginning in the late 1970s. Relatively effective restrictions could not be implemented without a constitutional amendment, which depends on a legislative two-thirds majority and hence on the support of both the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Strong reform was delayed until 1993 in part because of the supermajority requirement and the SPD’s ideological commitment to a strong asylum right. The latter was largely a legacy of the party’s experiences under the Third Reich, when some party leaders found asylum abroad. However, explaining the SPD’s departure from tradition in voting for sharp asylum restrictions in the 1990s requires analyzing subnational politics and social movements, factors that also help explain why constitutional reform was not possible earlier.

The Politics of Asylum Restrictions, 1980

In March and June 1980 the federal government announced visa requirements and an employment ban, measures that sharply reduced the entry rates of asylum seekers. These restrictions were adopted after a large increase in asylum applications in 1979–1980, especially from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Vietnam. Politicians from the center-right parties, the CDU and its affiliate in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), insisted that most of these people were seeking economic opportunities rather than fleeing political persecution. The CSU leaders pressed for restrictions more far-reaching than anything adopted before the 1990s, especially the authority to turn away asylum seekers at the border, and center-right leaders began to speak of the need for constitutional reform. The timing of the restrictions appears to contradict the political autonomy thesis. But the leaders of the governing parties in Bonn, including the foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (from the Free Democratic Party, FDP), and interior minister Gerhard Baum (SPD), strongly resisted restrictions, in part because the visa requirements for citizens of Turkey would contravene an agreement with...
that country. A closer look at the political processes shows that their resistance was overcome only because the large increase in asylum applications coincided with election campaigns, subnational elite mobilization, and the threat of social movement activity.

In confirmation of the subnational mobilization thesis, state and local politicians led the drive for asylum restrictions. During 1978–1982 government officials in two southern states, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, took a harder line in their state policies toward asylum seekers, pressed legislative initiatives in the Bundesrat, publicized the issue, and threatened to use it against the SPD in the federal election campaign later that year. In 1980 antiimmigration forces benefited from the coincidence between the influx of asylum applicants and scheduled elections for the Baden-Württemberg state parliament and the federal Bundestag. The Baden-Württemberg government, led by Lothar Spät (CDU), announced in early February 1980 that it would implement a ban on employment and pay social assistance mostly in kind rather than in cash; if the federal government failed to act, the state would also refuse to take its quota of asylum seekers. In response, just weeks before the Baden-Württemberg state elections, the federal government announced visa requirements for all citizens of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Sri Lanka.

Antiimmigration pressure from local government also helped to put the issue on the top of the political agenda in Bonn and therefore helped force the federal government into adopting restrictions before the October Bundestag election. For example, soon after the Baden-Württemberg election Essen mayor Horst Katzor (SPD) drew headlines by refusing to accept more asylum seekers. Katzor was in a strong position to pressure the federal government; he enjoyed the support of the association of municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia, which he headed, and had personal influence with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Where local officials were reluctant to accept more asylum seekers, for example, in many Baden-Württemberg communities in 1980, they were motivated by potential social movement activities by local citizens groups and not merely by the costs created by the new arrivals. Since much of the cost of social assistance and housing was reimbursed by state governments, finding suitable housing in their jurisdiction for asylum seekers was the biggest challenge local government faced. It was made difficult by the reactions of German neighbors. Based on prior experience, local officials feared opposition from neighborhood groups if they tried to create asylum hostels or seize school gymnasiums or private apartments.

Antiimmigration mobilization was aided by West Germany’s decentralized political institutions, which give the states representation in the Bundesrat and make subnational governments responsible for asylum seekers’ housing and social assistance. But these institutions were not sufficient to produce mobilization or to guarantee the partial successes it achieved in 1980. Nor can the institutional framework explain why Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria were far out in front of the other states in both
their demands and their tactics, a pattern which continued into the 1990s. However, the center-right leaders of these states may have responded to the threat of mobilization by far right parties. The neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) did very well in the south in the late 1960s, gaining 7–10 percent of the vote, and in Bavaria intraparty tensions grew so serious that right-wing activists broke from the CSU to form the radical-right Republikaner party in 1983.63

The 1980 German case also supports the dramatic event thesis, although in a peculiar way. An SPD-FDP federal government adopted restrictions in 1980, despite its traditional commitments to liberal asylum rights and good relations with Turkey, in part because the government was concerned about potential social unrest. Resistance by local governments had created uncertainty about potential reactions from the German population. Moreover, in their statements state prime minister Lothar Späth and other Baden-Württemberg politicians often used rhetoric that hinted at disorder and violence: seizing school gymnasiums to house asylum seekers would lead to a “civil uprising”; too many asylum seekers might lead to “aggressions”; a “social and ethnic explosive [was] being brewed together”; and federal inaction would necessitate “civil-war-like discussions.”64 Moreover, neo-Nazi violence and other activities had been rising sharply since 1977, with the help of younger, more action-oriented recruits, and some of these groups were beginning to target guest workers with violence.65

Although no dramatic antiimmigrant events occurred, in spring 1980 it was difficult to know what might happen at the grass roots, and therefore the fear of dramatic events was sufficient to result in restrictions. The federal interior minister Baum was particularly concerned that the mobilization against asylum seekers could spill over into xenophobia expressed toward guest workers.66 In an important Bundestag address in which he endorsed visa requirements for asylum seekers, Baum stressed that guest workers were not a burden on the state and argued that the arrival of asylum seekers, by contrast, was a cause for concern. “Emotions were being awakened,” he said, in part because some communities were overburdened, but also in part because “emotions are being stirred up.”67

The Politics of the Constitutional Amendment to the Asylum Article, 1991–1993
The passage of Article 16a of the German Basic Law in May 1993 went far beyond the asylum restrictions adopted in the 1980s. By undercutting access to a full-fledged judicial appeals process for most asylum seekers, it greatly reduced applications.68 As in 1980, the policy change followed a major increase in immigration, 300,000 asylum seekers a year during 1990–1993. Moreover, an economic contraction began in eastern Germany soon after economic unification in 1990 and spread to western Germany.69 The new immigrants put economic burdens on state and local governments that contributed to the backlash against them.

Yet in many ways the political process of backlash unfolded independently of the
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economic grievances of the German population. The legislative campaign against asylum rights began well before the economic downturn in western Germany, and the campaign found little resonance in eastern Germany, where the economy collapsed in 1990. Furthermore, politicians created most of the public interest in the asylum issue. Voters in western Germany came to see asylum as the country’s dominant political problem, but the salience of the issue swung wildly during 1989–1993, when each of the five peaks in public concern was preceded by an increase in the political debate on asylum rights.

Moreover, asylum seekers were targeted while ethnic German resettlers were not, in part because of the privileged political status of resettlers (who automatically received German citizenship) and in part because of the legacies of previous policies toward asylum seekers. The 1980 restrictions prevented asylum seekers from working, which burdened state and local governments with social assistance costs and increased popular resentments. Also, in the 1980s state governments began to force asylum seekers to live in government hostels, which exposed them to greater violence by skinheads.

The asylum debate and the SPD’s decision to accept the constitutional amendment were strongly influenced by subnational mobilization, especially by leaders of the southern states and many mayors. The Bavarian interior minister initiated the debate with a call for a constitutional amendment in 1991, and throughout 1991–1992 the CDU/CSU openly tried to pressure the SPD by mobilizing state and local SPD politicians against asylum seekers. Eventually many local SPD leaders including Georg Kronawitter, the mayor of Munich, became vocal advocates of constitutional reform. Pressure from the lower-level representatives and members of the SPD was important in the SPD’s change of position through a series of decisions in various party organs during fall and winter 1992–1993. Local politicians often came under pressure from citizens’ initiatives that opposed the housing of asylum seekers in their neighborhoods, for example, in Saarlouis and Hanover.

Finally, dramatic events against asylum seekers were crucial in the SPD’s decision to accept a constitutional amendment. In three state elections held in 1991–1992, far right parties (the Republikaner and German People’s Union) combined to win a surprising 7–12 percent of the vote by campaigning against asylum seekers. The far right’s success in two SPD-governed northern states was especially shocking, since the SPD’s leaders had previously viewed the far right as largely a problem on the right flank of the CDU and CSU, especially in southern Germany. Far right parties did well in the northern states largely because events there raised the salience of the asylum issue. In Bremen the SPD switched in 1991 from an extremely liberal asylum policy to a much more restrictive policy, and in Schleswig-Holstein Kurdish asylum seekers and their allies from left-wing protest groups squatted in some churches in winter 1991–1992. The far right’s electoral successes gave new impetus to the asylum debate and drove the SPD to seek a compromise with the center-right parties.
Popular riots and other antiforeigner violence were widely interpreted as evidence that public concern with the asylum issue was intense. Adult German residents, whom the press and politicians regarded as “normal citizens,” joined skinheads in antiforeigner riots in Hoyerswerda (September 1991) and Rostock (August 1992). These riots had a particularly profound effect on the asylum debate and the SPD’s switch in position. The riots, together with government unwillingness to repress antiforeigner violence, provided proamendment forces with the argument that asylum reform was needed in order to head off further violence. For example, the head of the chancellor’s office rejected the SPD’s demands for special police units to protect asylum seekers after the riots on the grounds that it was pointless to “cure symptoms” when the real problem was the legal right to asylum. In the wake of such statements, the SPD called an emergency party meeting for mid November, which accepted the need to amend Article 16. The federal government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), did not call for a major crackdown on antiforeigner violence until after the murder of a Turkish guest worker’s family in November 1992.

The riots in eastern Germany were caused by social movement organizations that met with favorable political opportunity structures at the local level, not primarily by economic grievances. In both riot cities unemployment was below the average for eastern Germany, and the foreign population was actually declining in Hoyerswerda. Riots occurred because cultural conflicts between foreign and German residents over matters such as noise and garbage were not channeled into other forms of citizen participation, and police allowed violence to escalate. The conditions necessary for antiforeigner riots were quite uncommon, even in eastern Germany. Although asylum seekers were sent to about one hundred different counties and cities in the eastern states, only five localities experienced riots on consecutive days, and only Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Quedlinburg had riots involving hundreds of adults.

When authorities removed asylum seekers from the Hoyerswerda and Rostock neighborhoods where they were attacked, this apparent capitulation to the rioters’ demands helped trigger attacks on foreigners in hundreds of locations in eastern and western Germany. Skinhead and neo-Nazi groups carried out 500 firebombings and 1500 other violent crimes per year during 1991–1993, mostly against asylum seekers. The violence affected many SPD-governed states more strongly than the center-right-governed southern states. The attacks were widely reported, and the reports added urgency to the decision-making process within the SPD.

Conclusions

All five hypotheses concerning subnational mobilization and social movements were largely confirmed by the cases analyzed here. First, the political processes that mediate between socioeconomic conditions and policies often have a life of their own.
These processes led to restrictions in Britain at a time when the economy was nearly at full employment and businesses needed black migrant labor. Immigration rates increased dramatically in Britain only because leading politicians responded to the London riots with loud calls for immigration control. Although asylum seekers burdened state governments in Germany, ideological motivations were stronger than material interests for more than a decade, as only some of the conservative states strongly opposed the liberal federal policy and the SPD-governed states were unwilling to push for restrictions. In defiance of the logic of ethnic competition, the anti-immigrant backlash in Germany was strongly concentrated against asylum seekers, who were not allowed to work or live in normal housing, rather than against the five million guest workers and their families, who were much more likely to compete with Germans for jobs and apartments.

Second, state and local politicians, not national ones, were in the vanguard of the anti-immigration forces during the long periods when the immigration control issue developed into a major political theme. Mobilization by state or local elites preceded and influenced national debates over restrictive policies in every case examined here, implying that it may be a necessary condition of strong and effective national mobilization for immigration control.

Third, subnational politicians acted not purely on their own initiative, but rather under pressure, or potential pressure, from social movement organizations. Social movements involved a wide range of groups and activities, from respectable to disreputable, from voting to discussions to violence. The underlying message often seemed to be the same: the immigrants already in the country were unwelcome, and additional immigration was unwanted.

Fourth, dramatic anti-immigrant events have a major impact on national politics because national elites strain to read the public mood on immigration. The timing of dramatic events helps explain why controls on black immigration in Britain were adopted so early and at such low levels of immigration and unemployment but why the constitutional asylum right in Germany was abridged at a relatively late date and only after very large increases in immigration and unemployment. In Britain antiblack rioting broke the liberal consensus already in 1958, paving the way for local organizations to mobilize resolutions, petition signatures, and votes for the antiimmigration cause. The riots also set the tone for national interpretations of later local events. They made it more likely that the Conservative Party would give strong weight to local party resolutions and petitions that represented only a small minority of voters and that the Labour Party would overinterpret the Smethwick election. In Germany more than ten years of mobilization against asylum rights by the CSU and parts of the CDU failed to achieve relatively effective controls on asylum seekers because suitable dramatic events did not occur until the early 1990s. Before 1991 violence against asylum seekers was limited to a few small neo-Nazi organizations without support from local residents. The vague threat of dramatic events in spring...
1980 was enough to force visa and employment restrictions that year but not enough for the constitutional change sought by some center-right party leaders. The early 1990s were different in that riots and far right electoral successes seemed to show that “normal citizens” finally were strongly concerned about asylum rights. Even the SPD’s more ideological activists and leaders, bitter at what seemed like blackmail by the center-right parties and the far right, interpreted these local events to indicate a pressing need for immigration controls.

Finally, these dramatic events were produced by social movement organizations operating in favorable local political environments, not simply by economic grievances. Many places in western Europe have had immigrants and unemployment; only a very few have experienced antiimmigrant riots or electoral victories by outrageously antiimmigrant candidates. The places that host such events present unusual combinations of organizations and opportunities: social movement groups, sympathetic or blundering subnational elites, and police who respond passively to antiimmigrant violence. For these reasons, dramatic antiimmigrant events are uncommon and not closely related to increases in immigration or unemployment. But when dramatic events occur, precisely their uncommonness makes them frightening. National politicians are prone to overinterpret them as expressions of more widespread political processes which, they fear, may be emerging.

NOTES

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1. The focus here is somewhat narrower than the question why restrictions are adopted in all cases, even those lacking public mobilization. The latter are influenced by state actors’ desire to preempt the kinds of processes described here.

2. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 34–39; also Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1984), ch. 6. This article discusses the Federal Republic of Germany, that is, West Germany until October 1990 and reunified Germany thereafter. The West German Basic Law and governmental, administrative, judicial, and party systems were extended with only slight modifications to reunified Germany after 1990.


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12. Money, “No Vacancy,” is a major exception, critiqued below.


15. Eurobarometer survey 1992; Jens Alber, “Zur Erklärung fremdenfeindlicher Gewalt in Deutschland,” in Ekkehard Mochmann and Uta Gerhardt, eds., Gewalt in Deutschland (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 39–77; Manfred Kuechler, “Germans and ‘Others,’” German Politics, 3 (April 1994), 64. I refer to public opinion, local violence, and some residents groups and far right parties as antiimmigrant because they express opposition to the presence of the existing immigrant population as well as to additional immigration. Demands by most established politicians and some residents groups for immigration control (not repatriation) thus involve a channeling of antiimmigrant sentiment into an antiimmigration agenda.
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18. Definitions are adapted from Tilly, *From Mobilization*, pp. 52, 62, and Tarrow, pp. 3–6, 135–36.


25. Also, when East Germany began aiding asylum seekers from Third World countries to enter West Germany through Berlin in 1985–86, the West German government reached an agreement with East Germany to require visas. For reasons of space, this third case will not be discussed.


27. Paul Foot, *Immigration and Race in British Politics* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), p. 139; Layton-Henry, p. 75. Black immigration dropped from 85,000 per year in 1960–62 to 40,000 per year in 1963–66; Layton-Henry, p. 13; Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, eds., *European Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1992), p. 121. Thus, immigration rates returned to the level of the 1950s. Yet the 1962 act was even more restrictive than these figures suggest. Since most of the post-1962 immigrants were family members of blacks already in Britain, whose numbers remained unrestricted, it prevented a much higher immigration rate.

28. Voluntary agreements proved impossible due to resistance from the Commonwealth countries’ governments, which also opposed the unilateral British controls.

29. Author’s analysis of *Times (London) Index*, 1954–1966, and *Hansards (General Index, House of Commons)*, 1945–1966. See also Roger Karapin, “Major Anti-Minority Riots and National Legislative Campaigns against Immigrants in Britain and Germany,” in Ruun Koopmans and Paul Statham, eds., *Challenging and Defending the Fortress* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), Figure 1.


32. The importance of these groups in Nottingham has been disputed. See James Wickenden, *Colour in Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32–33; Pilkington, pp. 101–2.

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34. Madgwick, Steeds, and Williams, p. 82.
36. Compared with about 0.4 percent for Britain as a whole. Layton-Henry, p. 13, own calculation.
40. Madgwick, Steeds, and Williams, p. 87.
42. Labour’s shift was also related to the party’s taking power nationally with a razor-thin majority of five seats in the House of Commons.
43. While there is some evidence for anti-immigration voting in the Leyton election, it probably had little effect on the outcome. See Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 147; Foot, p. 64.
46. Ibid., p. 159, own calculations.
47. Money, “No Vacancy,” p. 705.
49. Foot, pp. 136–37, 142.
53. Restrictions were adopted against other groups under the threat of political mobilization, though with little public backlash by elites or social movements. An administrative ban in 1973 limited the entry of guest workers, but non-European (mainly Turkish) immigration continued due to relatively liberal provisions for family reunification. The only major public mobilization against Turkish guest workers ended with a brief and ineffectual voluntary return program in the early 1980s. Resettlement of ethnic Germans was limited in the early 1990s to an annual quota of 225,000 with application required in the country of origin; these restrictions were adopted after the SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine threatened to mobilize publicly against this group as a counterpart to the center-right parties’ legislative campaigns against asylum seekers. Martin, pp. 196–217.
55. Between 1978 and 1982, three relatively ineffective laws to shorten asylum decision procedures and reduce social and housing benefits for asylum seekers in West Germany were also passed. Münch, pp. 72-99.
56. Jürgen Dittberner, “Asylpolitik und Parlament: Der Fall Berlin,” *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 17 (1986), 168; Meier-Braun, pp. 49ff. Asylum applications increased from 33,000 in 1978 to 108,000 in

57. Meier-Braun, p. 81.
58. Frankfurter Rundschau, Feb. 7, 1980. The quota was established by an agreement among the state interior ministers in 1978. Münch, p. 66.
64. Frankfurter Rundschau, Mar. 15, 1980; Rheinischer Merkur, July 18, 1980; Gerstner, p. 309.
68. The reform restricted rights for those who originated in a “persecution-free country,” which included Romania and the other countries from which most asylum seekers originated, and for those who had traveled through a “safe” country, which included all of Germany’s neighbors. Basic Law, Article 16a. Asylum applications dropped to about 100,000 per year in 1994–1997.
71. Kuechler, p. 54; Karapin, “Anti-Minority Riots,” Figure 1.
79. Author’s estimate of number of locations. Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen; Bacher-Organisations-Karte: Deutschland 1:600000 (Fürstenfeldbruck: Berndtson and Berndtson, n.d.); Karapin, “Anti-Minority Riots,” Table 2.
rate of violence was about five to ten times that of the 1980s.

82. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, “Fragen und Antworten zum Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland” (October 1993).