**PSC 76000: Basic Concepts and Theories of International Relations**

Zachary Shirkey Class Room:

Office: 5206 Class Time:

zshirkey@gc.cuny.edu Office Hours:

212-772-5503

Course Description:

The purpose of this course is to introduce students to the different theories and concepts used to understand and explain world politics. The focus of this course will be theoretical rather than empirical. The course examines major theories and central theoretical debates in the field of International Relations (IR). Each class will be devoted to an in-depth critical discussion of a different theoretical perspective in IR, focusing on its key concepts, foundational assumptions, and central arguments. **Note that readings that would generally be classified as realist, liberal, or constructivist frequently appear in weeks not explicitly dedicated to those paradigms.**

Requirements:

Students are expected to **complete all of the assigned required readings prior to the class for which they are assigned and come ready to discuss them**. That includes the readings for the first class. Students must be able to analyze the readings critically and draw connections and contrasts between readings not only with the other readings assigned for that week but also with readings from earlier in the course.

The recommended readings serve as a list of potential starting points for future research projects in a given area. Obviously, even including the recommended readings **the syllabus is only a limited listing of the important readings in the field.** Searching for other IR field survey syllabuses on the internet will give you a sense of what a wide range of scholars believe is central to the field or a particular topic of inquiry. **You also should note what sort of research gets into each journal so as to give you a sense of which outlets would give your own research the warmest reception and what journals you should pay attention to given your scholarly interests.**

Participation in class discussions will be part of students’ grades; thus attendance is mandatory. There are also two written assignments: a take home midterm and take home final. The grade will be broken down as follows:

Participation: 10%

Midterm: 30%

Final: 60%

**Late work will be penalized at least a full letter grade**, more in instances of extreme lateness. **There is no extra credit.**

Academic Integrity:

The definition of plagiarism in the Graduate Center Policy on Academic Honesty is as follows. Each member of the academic community is expected to give full, fair, and formal credit to any and all sources that have contributed to the formulation of ideas, methods, interpretations, and findings. The absence of such formal credit is an affirmation representing that the work is fully the writer's. The term “sources” includes, but is not limited to, published or unpublished materials, lectures and lecture notes, computer programs, mathematical and other symbolic formulations, course papers, examinations, theses, dissertations, and comments offered in class or informal discussions, and includes electronic media. The representation that such work of another person is the writer's own is plagiarism.

Care must be taken to document the source of any ideas or arguments. If the actual words of a source are used, they must appear within quotation marks. In cases that are unclear, it is the responsibility of the writer to take due care to avoid plagiarism.

The source should be cited whenever:

(a) a text is quoted verbatim

(b) data gathered by another are presented in diagrams or tables

(c) the results of a study done by another are used

(d) the work or intellectual effort of another is paraphrased by the writer

Because the intent to deceive is not a necessary element in plagiarism, careful note taking

and record keeping are essential in order to avoid unintentional plagiarism.

Student found engaging in plagiarism risk not only failing the assignment in question, but also the entire course, as well as potentially facing further academic sanctions from the Graduate Center included expulsion. Please see the Graduate Center’s guide on Avoiding and Detecting Plagiarism for more information:

<https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-Center/PDF/Publications/AvoidingPlagiarism.pdf?ext=.pdf>

Students with Disabilities:

In compliance with the American Disability Act of 1990 (ADA) and with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, The Graduate Center offers assistance and accommodations for all students with documented disabilities and/or medical conditions. It is recommended that all students with documented disabilities consult the Vice President for Student Affairs who is the 504/ADA Coordinator (Room 7301; 212-817-7400). For more information (with confidentiality) contact Sharon Lerner or Elise Perram at the above number or via email at [disabilityservices@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:disabilityservices@gc.cuny.edu) and consult the Graduate Center Student Handbook.

Course Materials:

Most of the assigned readings are available on Blackboard. There are two books which are available for purchase and are in the Graduate Center library. They are:

* Lukes, Steven. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. London: MacMillan Press.
* Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Course Schedule:

August 27: Theories, Causation, and Levels of Analysis

*Required:*

* Lakatos, Imre. 1969. “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. New Series. 69: 149–68.
* Almond, Gabriel A. and Stephen J. Genco. 1977. “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,” *World Politics* 29(4): 489–522.
* Lijphart, Arend. 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” *American Political Science Review* 65(3): 682–93.
* Fearon, James. 1991. “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” *World Politics* 43(2): 169–95.
* Allison, Graham. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *American Political Science Review* 63(3): 689–718.
* Putnam, Robert D. 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42(3): 427–60.
* Sjoberg, Laura. 2008. “Scaling IR Theory: Geography’s Contribution to Where IR Takes Place,” *International Studies Review* 10(3): 472–500.

*Recommended:*

* Agnew, John. 1994. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1(1): 53–80.
* Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. 2015. “International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations,” *International Organization* 69(2): 273–309.
* Dessler, David. 1989. “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?,” *International Organization* 43(4): 441–73.
* Elman, Colin and Miriam Elman. 2002. “How Not to be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising Progress in Research,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46(2): 275–91.
* Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Research,” *Political Analysis* 2(1): 131–50.
* Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” *International Organization* 32(4): 881–911.
* King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry.*
* Krasner, Stephen. 1972. “Are Bureaucracies Important?,” *Foreign Policy* 7: 159–79.
* Levy, Jack S. 2015. “Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis,” *Security Studies* 24(3): 378–402.
* Levy, Jack. 2008. “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” *Conﬂict Management and Peace Science* 25(1): 1–18.
* Mohr, Lawrence B. 1996. *The Causes of Human Behavior*.
* Sagan, Scott. 1996/1997. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security* 21(Winter): 54–86.
* “Symposium on Research Design and Method in IR,” 2001. *International Organization* 55(2): 439–507.
* Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41(3): 335–70.

September 3: Power

*Required:*

* Dahl, Robert. 1957. “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2(3): 201–15.
* Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “The Two Faces of Power,” *American Political Science Review* 56(4): 947–52.
* Lukes, Steven. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. London: MacMillan Press.
* Barnett, Michael and Raymond. Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization* 59(1): 39–75.
* Hall, Rodney Bruce. 1997. “Moral Authority as a Power Resource,” *International Organization* 51(4): 591–622.
* Nye, Joseph. 2021. “Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept,” *Journal of Political Power* 14(1): 196–208.
* Goddard, Stacie E. and Daniel H. Nexon. 2016. “The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1(1): 4–18.

*Recommended*

* Ackerly, Brooke and Jacqui True. 2008. “Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research on International Relations,” *International Studies Review* 10(4): 693–707.
* Art, Robert. 1996. “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force,” *Security Studies* 5: 7–42.
* Art, Robert. 1999. “Force and Fungibility Reconsidered,” *Security Studies* 8(4): 183–89.
* Baldwin, David. 1999. “Force, Fungibility, and Influence,” *Security Studies* 8(4): 173–83.
* Baldwin, David. 1989. *Paradoxes of Power.*
* Brass, Paul. 2000. “Foucault Steals Political Science,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 305–30.
* Clark, Ian. 2007. *Legitimacy in International Society*.
* Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness.*
* “Special Issue: Changing Faces of Power, 1979 –2019.” *Journal of Political Power* 14(1).

September 10: (Neo)Classical Realism and (Neo)Classical Liberalism

*Required*

* Williams, Michael C. 2004. “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 58(4): 633–65.
* Parent, Joseph M. and Joshua M. Baron. 2011. “Elder Abuse: How the Moderns Mistreat Classical Realism,” *International Studies Review* 13(2): 193–213.
* Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security* 29(2): 159-201.
* Rathbun, Brian. 2008. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” *Security Studies* 17(2): 294–321.
* Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80(4): 1151–69.
* Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51(4): 513–53.
* Weiss, Jeremy. 2013. “E. H. Carr, Norman Angell, and Reassessing the Realist-Utopian Debate,” *The International History Review* 35(5): 1156–84.

*Recommended*

* Angell, Norman. 1910. *The Great Illusion.*
* Carr, E. H. 1939. *The Twenty Years Crisis.*
* Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1962. *Power and International Relations.*
* de Carvalho, Benjamin, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson. 2011. “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” *Millennium* 39(3): 735–58.
* Doyle, Michael W. 1983. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts 1 & 2,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12(3): 205–35 and 12(4): 323–53.
* Foulon, Michiel. 2015. “Neoclassical Realism: Challenges and Bridging Identities,” *International Studies Review* 17(4): 635–61.
* Haas, Mark L. 2014. “Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics,” *Security Studies* 23(4): 715–53.
* Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. *Leviathan.*
* Kant, Immanuel. 1795. *Perpetual Peace*.
* Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1532. *The Prince* and *The Discourses*.
* MacKay, Joseph and Christopher David LaRoche. 2018. “Why is There No Reactionary International Theory?,” *International Studies Quarterly* 62(2): 234–44.
* Molloy, Sean. Forthcoming. “Theorizing Liberal Orders in Crisis then and Now: Returning to Carr and Horkheimer,” *International Security Studies*.
* Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. *Politics Among Nations.*
* Owen, John. 2001. “Transnational Liberalism and US Primacy,” *International Security* 26(3): 117–52.
* Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics* 51(1): 144–72.
* Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*.
* Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. *Discord and Collaboration.*

September 17: Structural Realism and Its Critics

*Required:*

* Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill. **Chs. 4–5 and 8 (pp. 60–101 and 161–193) only**. Skim the rest if you have time.
* Fearon, James D. 2018. “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy,” *International Organization* 72(3): 523–59.
* Polansky, David. 2016. “Drawing Out the Leviathan: Kenneth Waltz, Hobbes, and the Neorealist Theory of the State,” *International Studies Review* 18(2): 268–89.
* Walt, Stephen M. 2009. “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” *World Politics* 61(1): 86–120.
* Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian. 2013. “Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism,” *International Relations* 27(2): 202–25.
* Schroeder, Paul. 1994. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” *International Security* 19(1): 108–48.
* Osiander, Andreas. 2001. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization* 55(2): 251–87.

*Recommended:*

* Bessner, Daniel and Nicholas Guilhot. 2015. “How Realism Waltzed Off,” *International Security* 40(2): 87–118.
* Betts, Richard. 1992. “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe,” *International Security* 17(1): 5–43.
* Brooks, Stephen G. and William Wohlforth. 2005. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” *International Security* 30(1): 72–108.
* Elman, Miriam Fendius. 1995. “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25(2): 171–217.
* Keohane, Robert. (ed.). 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics.*
* Mastanduno, Michael, David Lake, and G. John Ikenberry. 1989. “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33: 457–74.
* Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.*
* Mearsheimer, John. 1994/1995. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.
* Schweller, Randall. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19(1): 72–107.
* Trachtenberg, Marc. 2003. “The Question of Realism: A Historian’s View,” *Security Studies* 13(Autumn): 156–94.
* Vasquez, John A. 1997. “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neorealist Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” *American Political Science Review* 91(4): 889–912.
* Walt, Stephen. 1985. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9(4): 3–43.

September 24: Liberal Institutionalism

*Required:*

* Keohane, Robert O. 1986. “Reciprocity in International Relations,” *International Organization* 40(1): 1–27.
* Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721–37.
* Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica F. Green, and Robert O. Keohane. 2016. “Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance,” *International Organization* 70(2): 247–78.
* Lall, Ranjit. 2017. “Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Institutions,” *International Organization* 71(2): 245–81.
* Ikenberry, G. John and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” *International Organization* 44(3): 283–315.
* Snidal, Duncan. 1991. “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review* 85(3): 701–26.
* Jervis, Robert. 1999. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* 24(1): 42–63.

*Recommended:*

* Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.*
* Baldwin, David (ed.). 1993. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*.
* Brooks, Stephen G. 1999. “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(5): 646–70.
* Ikenberry, G. John. 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*.
* Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1999. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” *International Security* 20(1): 39–51.
* Kupchan, Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan. 1995. “The Promise of Collective Security,” *International Security* 20(1): 52–61.
* Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen Milner. 2012. *The Politics of International Cooperation.*
* Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: A Review Essay,” *World Politics* 44(3): 466–96.
* Morrow, James. 2001. “The Institutional Features of Prisoners of War Treaties,” *International Organization* 55(4): 971–91.
* Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action.*
* Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons.*
* Oye, Kenneth. 1985. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” *World Politics* 38(1): 1–24.
* Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2008. *A New World Order*.
* Thompson, Alex. 2006. “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission,” *International Organization* 61(1): 1–34.
* Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation*.
* von Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance,” *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611–22.

October 15: The Assumption of Anarchy and the State System

*Required:*

* Milner, Helen. 1991. “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” *Review of International Studies* 17(1): 67–85.
* Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International Systems to International Society,” *International Organization* 47(3): 327–52.
* Clark, Ian. 2009. “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?,” *International Relations* 23(3): 464–80.
* Mattern, Janice Bially and Ayse Zarakol. 2016. “Hierarchies in World Politics,” *International Organization* 70(3): 623–54.
* Nedal, Dani K. and Daniel H. Nexon. 2019. “Anarchy and Authority: International Structure, the Balance of Power, and Hierarchy,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4(2): 169–89.
* Donnelly, Jack. 2012. “The Differentiation of International Societies,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(1): 151–76.
* Phillips, Andrew and J. C. Sharman. 2015. “Explaining Durable Diversity in International Systems: State, Company, and Empire in the Indian Ocean,” *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 436–48.

*Recommended:*

* Barder, Alexander. 2015. *Empire Within: International Hierarchy and Its Imperial Laboratories of Governance*.
* Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society.*
* Buzan, Barry and Richard Little. 2000. *International Systems in World History.*
* Howard, Michael. 1970. *War in European History.*
* Jervis, Robert. 1997. *Systems Effects.*
* Kayaoglu, Turan. 2010. “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” *International Studies Review* 12(2): 193–217.
* Krasner, Stephen D. 2001. “Rethinking the Sovereign State Model,” *Review of International Studies* 27: 17–42.
* Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*.
* MacDonald. Paul K. 2017. “Embedded Authority: A Relational Network Approach to Hierarchy in World Politics,” *Review of International Studies* 44(1): 128–50.
* McConaughey, Meghan, Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon. 2018. “Beyond Anarchy: Logics of Political Organization, Hierarchy, and International Structure,” *International Theory* 10(2): 181–218.
* Nexon, Daniel H. and Iver B. Neumann. 2018. “Hegemonic-Order Theory: A Field-Theoretic Account,” *European Journal of International Relations* 24(3): 662–86.
* Spruyt, Hendrik. 1996. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*.
* Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992.*
* Watson, Adam. 1992. *The Evolution of International Society.*
* Weber, Katja. 1997. “Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Cost Approach to International Security Cooperation,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2): 321–40.

October 22: Constructivism **Midterm Handed Out**

*Required:*

* Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46(2): 391–425.
* Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52(4): 855–85.
* Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organization. 53(2): 379-408.
* Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52(4): 887–917.
* Acharya, Amitav. 2004. “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” *International Organization* 58(2): 239–75.
* Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2005. “Religion and (Inter-)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents,” *Alternatives* 30(2): 113–40.
* McCourt, David M. 2016 “Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(3): 475–85.

*Recommended:*

* Albert, Mathias, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Alexander Wendt*.* 2010. *New Systems Theories of World Politics*.
* Bayram, A. Burcu. 2017. “Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics,” *International Organization* 71(S1): S137–S64.
* Copeland, Dale C. 2000. “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 25(2): 187–212.
* Finnemore, Martha. 2003. *The Purpose of Intervention*.
* Florini, Ann. 1996. “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40(3): 363–89.
* Hopf, Ted. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory,” *International Security* 23(1): 171–200.
* Hopf, Ted. 2010. “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 16(4): 539–561.
* Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 487–515.
* Keck, Margaret E. and Katherine Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*.
* Legro, Jeffrey. 1997. “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” *International Organization* 51(1): 31–63.
* Shelton, Dinah. 2006. “Normative Hierarchy in International Law,” *The American Journal of International Law* 100(2): 291–323.
* Walzer, Michael. 1977. *Just and Unjust Wars.*
* Wiener, Antje. 2014. *A Theory of Contestation*.

October 29: Gender and Race **Midterm Due**

*Required:*

* Carpenter, Charli. 2002. “Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?,” *International Studies Review* 167–79.
* Tickner, J. Ann. 2005. “What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions,” *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1): 1–22.
* Hutchings, Kimberly and Patricia Owens. 2021. “Women Thinkers and the Canon of International Thought: Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution,” *American Political Science Review* 115(2): 347–59.
* Acharya, Amitav. 2022. “Race and Racism in the Founding of the Modern World Order,” *International Affairs* 98(1): 23–43.
* Seth, Sanjay. 2011. “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations,” *Millennium* 40(1): 167–83.
* Hobson, John M. 2022. “Unmasking the Racism of Orthodox International Relations / International Political Economy Theory*,” Security Dialogue* 53(1): 3–20.

OR

* Sabarathnam, Meera. 2020. “Is IR Theory White? Racialised Subject-Positioning in three Canonical Textts,”*Millennium* 49(1): 3–31.
* Nincic, Miroslav and Donna J. Nincic. 2002. “Race, Gender, and War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 547–68.

*Recommended:*

* Caprioli, Mary. 2005. “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict,” *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 161–78.
* Caprioli, Mary. 2004. “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” *International Studies Review* 6(2): 253–69.
* Goldstein, Joshua. 2001. *War and Gender.*
* Naurin, Daniel, Elin Naurin, and Amy Alexander. 2019. “Gender Stereotyping and Chivalry in International Negotiations: A Survey Experiment in the Council of the European Union,” *International Organization* (73): 2: 469–88.
* Schramm, Madison and Alexandra Stark. 2020. “Peacemakers or Iron Ladies? A Cross-National Study of Gender and International Conflict,” *Security Studies* 29(3): 515–48.
* Schwartz, Joshua A. and Christopher W. Blair. 2020. “Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining,” *International Organization* 74(4): 872–95.
* “Special Issue: Race and Imperialism in International Relations: Theory and Practice,” *International Affairs* 98(1).
* Tickner, J. Ann.1992. *Gender in International Relations*.
* Webster, Kaitlyn, Chong Chen, and Kyle Beardsley. 2019. “Conflict, Peace, and the Evolution of Women’s Empowerment,” *International Organization* 73(2): 255–90.
* Zalewski, Marysia. 2007. “Do We Understand Each Other Yet? Troubling Feminist Encounters With(in) International Relations,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9(2): 302–12.

November 5: Rationalist Approaches

*Required:*

* Milner, Helen. 1998. “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics,” *International Organization* 52(4): 759–86.
* Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
* Wagner, Harrison. 2000. “Bargaining and War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 469–84.
* Powell, Robert. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem,” *International Organization* 60(1): 169–203.
* Weisiger, Alex. 2016. “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration,” *International Organization* 70(2): 347–75.
* Kirshner, Jonathan. 2015. “The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative,” *World Politics* 67(1): 155–79.
* Sen, Amartya. 1977. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6(4): 317–44.

*Recommended:*

* Bueno de Mesquita. Bruce. 2006. “Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 100(4): 637–42.
* Gartzke, Erik. 1999. “War is in the Error Term,” *International Organization* 53(3): 567–87.
* Levy, Jack S. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48(2): 279–312.
* Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav Slantchev. 2007. “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 755–71.
* Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End.*
* Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence.*
* Shirkey, Zachary C. 2016. “Uncertainty and War Duration,” *International Studies Review*. 18(2): 244–67.
* Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” *American Political Science Review* 97(4)
* Slantchev, Branislav and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. “Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 135–48.
* Smith, Alastair and Allan C. Stam. 2004. “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 783–813.
* Tarar, Ahmer. 2016. “A Strategic Logic of the Military *Fait Accompli*,” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(4): 742–52.
* Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and the State.*
* Weisiger, Alex. 2013. *Logics of War*.
* Wittman, Donald. 1979. “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23: 743–63.

November 12: Psychological Approaches

*Required:*

* Jervis, Robert. 2006. “Understanding Beliefs,” *Political Psychology* 27(5): 641–63.
* Mercer, Jonathan. 2010. “Emotional Beliefs,” *International Organization* 64(1): 1–31.
* Hafner-Burton, Emile M., et al. 2017. “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,” *International Organization* 71(S1): S1–S32.
* Stanley, Elizabeth A. 2018. “War Duration and the Micro-Dynamics of Decision-Making under Stress,” *Polity* 50(2): 178–200.
* Kertzer, Joshua D. 2017. “Resolve, Time, and Risk,” *International Organization* 71(S1): S109–S136.
* Johnson, Dominic D. P. and Dominic Tierney. 2011. “The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return,” *International Security* 36(1): 7–40.
* Offer, Avner. 1995. “Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?,” *Politics & Society* 23(2): 213–41.

*Recommended:*

* Davis, James W. and Rose McDermott. 2021. “The Past, Present, and Future of Behavioral IR,” *International Organization* 75(1): 147–77.
* Dolan, Thomas M. (2016) “Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime Success,” *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2): 230–42.
* Goldgeier, James and Philip Tetlock. 2001. “Psychology and International Relations Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 67–92.
* Farnham, Barbara. 1990. “Political Cognition and Decision-Making,” *Political Psychology* 11(1): 83–112.
* Larson, Deborah W. *The Origins of Containment.*
* Kier, Elizabeth. 1997. *Imagining War.*
* Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception.*
* Johnson, Dominic D. P. 2004. *Overconfidence and War*.
* Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. *Analogies at War.*
* Krebs, Ronald R. and Aaron Rapport. 2012. “International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56(3): 530–543.
* Lanoszka, Alexander and Michael A. Hunzeker.(2015) “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War,” *Security Studies* 24(4): 662–95.
* McDermott, Rose. 2004. “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade,” *Political Psychology* 25(2): 289–312.
* Mitzen, Jennifer and Randall L. Schweller. 2011. “Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War,” *Security Studies* 20(1): 2–35.
* O’Neill, Barry. 1998. *Honors, Symbols, and War.*
* Posen, Barry. 1984. *Sources of Military Doctrine.*
* Shelef, Nadav G. 2016. “Unequal Ground: Homelands and Conflict,” *International Organization* 70(1): 33–64.
* Streich, Philip and Jack S. Levy. 2016. “Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(4): 489–511.

November 19: International Political Economy

*Required:*

* Krasner, Stephen. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics* 28: 317–48.
* Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121–37.
* Hiscox, Michael. 2001. “Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade,” *International Organization*55(1): 1-46.
* Broz, J. Lawrence and Jeffry Frieden. 2001. “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science*4: 317–43.
* Simmons, Beth. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 819–35.
* Copelovitch, Mark. 2007. “Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Politics of IMF Lending,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49–77.
* Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins. 2004. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy,” *American Political Science Review* 1: 171–89.

*Recommended:*

* Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development,” *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369–1401.
* Frieden, Jeﬀry A. 1991. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” *International Organization* 45(4): 425–51.
* Hirschman, Albert O. 1980. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*.
* Hurrell, Andrew J. 1995. “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” *Review of International Studies* 21(4): 331–58.
* Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony.*
* Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. *The World in Depressions, 1929–1939.*
* Kirshner, Jonathan. 1997. *Currency and Coercion*.
* Lake, David. 1993. “Leadership. Hegemony, and the International Economy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37(4): 459–89.
* McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry.*
* Mosley, Layna. 2003. *Global Capital and National Governments*.
* Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure,” *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389–400.
* Oatley, Thomas. 1998. “Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord,” *International Organization* 52(1): 35–54.
* Oatley, Thomas. 2011. “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy,” *International Organization* 68(2): 311–41.
* Simmons, Beth. 1994. *Who Adjusts*.
* Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” *International Organization* 39(4): 579–614.
* Stone, Randall W. 2008. “The Scope of IMF Conditionality,” *International Organization* 62(4): 589–620.

November 26: War and Leaders

*Required:*

* Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30(2): 167–214.
* Biddle, Stephen. 2001. “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” *The Journal of Politics* 63(3): 741–74.
* Levy, Jack. 1986. “Organizational Routines and the Causes of War,” *International Studies Quarterly* 30(2): 193–222.
* Stanley, Elizabeth A. and John P. Sawyer. 2009. “The Equifinality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(5): 651–76.
* Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2004. “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” *World Politics* 56(3): 363–88.
* Croco, Sarah E. and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2016. “War Outcomes and Leader Tenure,” *World Politics* 68(4): 577–607.
* Cohen, Dana Kay and Sabrina M. Karim. 2022. “Does More Equality for Women Mean Less War? Rethinking Sex and Gender Inequality and Political Violence,” *International Organization* 76(2): 414–45.

*Recommended:*

* Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam. 1996. “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985,” *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 239–57.
* Betts, Richard. 2014. *American Force.*
* Clausewitz, Karl von. 1832. *On War*. (Howard and Paret translation, 1976).
* Colgan, Jeff. D. and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2015. “Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict,” *International Organization* 69(1): 163–94.
* Copeland, Dale. 2000. *The Origins of Major War*.
* Croco, Sarah. 2011. “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment,” *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 457–77.
* Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*.
* Goemans, Hein E. 2000. *War and Punishment.*
* Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2014. “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances,” *International Organization* 68(4): 775–809.
* Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577–92.
* Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. *Peacetime.*
* Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work?*
* Levy, Jack. 2008. “Preventive War and Domestic Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 52(1): 1–24.
* McManus, Roseanne W. 2018. “Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence,” *Journal of Politics* 80(3): 982–95.
* Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. 2004. “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 937–61.
* Rasler, Karen A. and William R. Thompson. 2006. “Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 145–67.
* Snyder, Jack S. 1984. “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” *International Security* 9(1), 108–46.
* Snyder, Jack and Borghard, Erica. 2011. “The Empty Costs of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not of Pound,” *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 437–56.
* Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” *Security Studies* 21(1): 3–42.
* Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. “Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *International Security* 9(1), 58–107.
* Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War,” *International Security* 22(4): 5–43.
* Vasquez, John A. and Brandon. Valeriano. 2010. “The Classification of Interstate Wars,” *Journal of Politics* 72(2): 292–309.
* Weisiger, Alex and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2015. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” *International Organization* 69(2): 473–95.

December 3: Civil War: **Final Handed Out: Due by email on December 17**

*Required:*

* Lemke, Douglas. 2003. “Development and War,” *International Studies Review* 5(4): 55–63.
* Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.
* Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Gleditsch. 2011. “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison,” *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 478–95.
* Christia, Fotini. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 2: 32–54.
* Stewart, Megan A. 2018. “Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War,” *International Organization* 72(1): 205–26.
* Prorok, Alyssa K. 2016. “Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 70–84.
* Cunningham, David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 875–92.

*Recommended:*

* Aydin, Aysegul, and Patrick M. Regan. 2011. “Networks of Interveners and Civil War Duration,” *European Journal of International Relations* 18(3): 573–97.
* Brancati, Dawn. 2006. “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?” *International Organization* 60(3): 651–87.
* Cunningham, David E. 2010. “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 115–27.
* Findley, Michael G. and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. “Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach,” *Journal of Politics* 68(4): 828–37.
* Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 33–48.
* Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?,” *World Politics* 54(1): 99–118.
* Regan, Patrick M. 2009. “Civil War and Territory? Drawing Linkages Between Interstate and Intrastate War,” *International Interactions* 35(3): 321–29.
* Salehyan, Idean. 2010. “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(3): 493–515.
* Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” *World Politics* 52: 437–83.
* Walter, Barbara. 2006. “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 313–30.

December 10: Democratic and Capitalist Peace

*Required:*

* Oneal, John, Bruce Russett, and Michael Berbaum. 2003. “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3): 371–93.
* Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. 2009. “A Comparative Test of Democratic Peace Arguments, 1946–2000,” *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 17–38.
* Barnhart, Joslyn N., Robert F. Trager, Elizabeth N. Saunders, and Allan Dafoe. “The Suffragist Peace,” 2020. *International Organization* 74(4): 633–70.
* Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2001. “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process,” *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 15–31.
* Gibler, Douglas M. and Jaroslav Tir. 2010. “Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Territorial Transfers,” *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 951–68.
* McDonald, Patrick J. 2015. “Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace,” *International Organization* 69(3): 557–89.
* Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166–91.

*Recommended:*

* Brown, M., S. Lynn-Jones, and S. Miller. (eds). 1996. *Debating the Democratic Peace*.
* Crawford, Neta. 1994. “A Security Regime Among Democracies: Cooperation Among Iroquois Nations,” *International Organization* 48(3): 345–85.
* Colaresi, Michael. 2012. “A Boom with Review: How Retrospective Oversight Increases the Foreign Policy Ability of Democracies,” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 671–89.
* Downs, Alexander and Todd Sechser. 2012. “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,” *International Organization* 66(3): 457–89.
* Doyle, Michael W. 1983. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts 1 and 2,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12(3): 205–35 and 12(4): 323–53.
* Gartzke, Erik and Alex Weisiger. 2013. “Fading Friendships: Alliances, Affinities, and the Activation of International Identities,” *British Journal of Political Science* 43(1): 25–52.
* Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict,” *International Studies Quarterly* 51(3): 509–32.
* Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2000. *Triangulating Peace.*
* Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 585–602.
  + Kinsella, David. 2005. “No Rest for the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 453–57.
  + Slantchchev, Branislav L., Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke. 2005. “Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace,” .*American Political Science Review* 99(3): 459–62.
  + Doyle, Michael. 2005. “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 463–66.
* Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?,” *International Organization* 53(2): 233–66.